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CIVIL RIGHTSITAX LAW-"UNDER COLOR OF" INTERNAL 
REVENUE LAWS: THE ROLE OF UNITED STATES V. TEMPLE AND 
§ 7214 IN THE "UNDER COLOR OF LAW" DEBATE 
INTRODUCTION 
On a normal day, most police officers are probably not worried 
that their actions in the line of duty will result in an IRS audit of 
their personal tax returns. Yet that is exactly the fear developed by 
two New York City police detectives on March 5, 2003, when they 
had the misfortune of arresting IRS Quality Analyst Eva Temple on 
charges of aggravated harassment.1 In the police car, after several 
aggressive and violent outbursts, Temple informed the detectives 
that, as an IRS employee, she had "the ability to initiate investiga­
tions and audits [of the detectives'] tax histories" and planned to do 
SO.2 
Believing Temple would pursue the audits she had threatened, 
the detectives reported the incident to the U.S. Treasury Depart­
ment.3 As a result, Temple was prosecuted under 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7214(a) for willful oppression "under color of law" by an em­
ployee of the United States acting in connection with an Internal 
Revenue law.4 
United States v. Temple is the first case to consider the meaning 
of "under color of law" in the context of § 7214(a).5 The concurring 
opinion in Temple raises the issue addressed in this Note: In § 7214 
cases, should a victim's subjective perception of an actor's authority 
play any role in determining whether the act was done "under color 
of law?"6 The majority opinion suggests that the detectives' per­
1. United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. 
Ct. 495 (2006). These charges were unrelated to her employment. Id. 
2. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
3. Id. 
4. Id. at 134 (citing 26 U.S.c. § 7214 (2000)). 
5. Id. at 137; First Impressions, 3 SETON HALL OR. REv. 113, 120-21 (2006) (in­
cluding Temple in the list of cases of first impression heard in federal courts in 2006). 
6. See Temple, 447 F.3d at 141-45 (Wesley, J., concurring). 
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ception of Temple's ability to initiate an audit is enough to find that 
she acted "under color of law" as required by § 7214(a).7 The con­
curring opinion agrees that Temple's actions were taken "under 
color of law," but argues that the determination should be based 
solely on objective criteria.8 
Discussion of the role of subjective beliefs in an "under color 
of law" analysis is new only in the context of § 7214(a). It has been 
debated for decades in respect to two civil rights statutes that also 
contain the phrase: 18 U.S.c. § 242 and 42 U.S.c. § 1983.9 In these 
statutes, the phrase "under color of law" is defined as the abuse of 
some state-granted authority, and is applied to government actors 
who overstep the bounds of their authority.1° It is generally agreed, 
in the context of §§ 242 and 1983, that a victim's subjective belief 
that the wrongdoer was invoking some official status should 'not be 
considered in the "under color of law" analysis.!l Such beliefs 
could create liability in a government agent acting in a purely per­
sonal capacity-a result these civil rights statutes were not intended 
to achieve. l2 
The concurring opinion in Temple adopts the reasoning used 
by courts in § 242 and § 1983 cases to support its assertion that the 
subjective belief of the victim has no place in an "under color of 
7. Id. at 139 (majority opinion). 
8. Id. at 141-42 (Wesley, J., concurring). Specifically, the concurrence argues that 
the court should look for objective indications of the defendant's official status, use of 
that status to achieve the harm, and the victim's objective awareness of that status. Id. 
at 145. Perhaps Temple could have been convicted using a completely objective stan­
dard: the detectives knew she was an IRS employee, having arrested her at the IRS 
office, and Temple knew they were aware of her status as a federal employee when she 
made the threat, having told them that she was an IRS agent. Id. at 132 (majority 
opinion). However, for the sake of argument, this Note will assume that the use of a 
subjective standard was necessary for Temple's conviction and will demonstrate why it 
was appropriate for the majority to take a subjective approach to the "under color of 
law" requirement in the context of § 7214. 
9. 18 U.S.c. § 242 (2000); 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (2000); see also Steve Libby, Note, 
When Off-Duty State Officials Act Under Color ofState Law for the Purposes ofSection 
1983, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 725, 733-46 (1992) (summarizing courts' struggles with 
objective and subjective analyses in § 1983 cases). 
10. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49-50 (1988); Screws v. United States, 325 
U.S. 91, 111 (1945); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941). 
11. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
12. See Screws, 325 U.S. at 111; Temple, 447 F.3d at 142 (Wesley, J., concurring); 
Libby, supra note 9, at 733-46. Creating liability in an official acting in a personal ca­
pacity is objectionable because, historically, § 242 and § 1983 liability for action "under 
color of law" can only arise when the actor has "a bona fide identity as a state official." 
Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of "Under Color of' Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323, 325­
28, 401 (1992). 
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law" inquiry in a § 7214(a) case.B However, while the concurring 
opinion is well reasoned under § 242 and § 1983 case law, that rea­
soning is inapplicable to § 7214(a). 
This Note contends that the appropriate measure of "under 
color of law" must be determined in light of the particular statute 
that employs the phrase. The phrase "under color of law" should 
have consistent meaning throughout the United States Code, but, at 
the same time, must be applied in the context of the individual stat­
ute in which the phrase appears. This Note will demonstrate that, 
in the context of § 7214(a), using a subjective measure of "under 
color of law" produces a result consistent with the purposes of that· 
statute and does not produce the same objectionable results as it 
would in the civil rights statutes. 
Part I of this Note provides background on the objective-ver­
sus-subjective debate by taking the reader through judicial interpre­
tations of the phrase "under color of law" as it is understood in 
§§ 242 and 1983, the primary sources of "under color of law" inter­
pretation in American jurisprudence. Part II introduces the legisla­
tive history and purpose of § 7214(a) and gives a summary of case 
law interpreting § 7214(a) to date. Part III summarizes the issue 
raised in the Temple case-the proper application of the phrase 
"under color of law" in a § 7214(a) case. Finally, Part IV demon­
strates that a subjective measure of "under color of law" is appro­
priate in § 7214(a) cases, and concludes that the Temple majority 
correctly considered the detectives' sUbjective perception of Tem­
ple's authority to find that she acted "under color of law." 
I. "UNDER COLOR OF LAW" IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 
A. The Definition of "Under Color of Law" 
By the time the phrase "under color of law" appeared in 
American statutes in the nineteenth century, it was a commonly 
known expression that had been used in English laws since the thir­
teenth century.14 The phrase "implies a misuse of power made pos­
13. See Temple, 447 F.3d at 141-45 (Wesley, J., concurring). 
14. Winter, supra note 12, at 326-27. In his article concerning the construction of 
42 U.S.c. § 1983, Winter traces the history of the phrase "colour of office," or "colore 
officii" back to a 1275 English statute providing "[t)hat no Escheator, Sheriff, nor other 
Bailiff of the King, by Colour of his Office, without ... Authority certain pertaining to 
his Office, disseise any Man [of his property)." Id. at 325 (first alteration in original) 
(quoting 3 Edw.l, ch. 24 (1275) (Eng.)). Winter provides several other examples of use 
of the phrase "under color of law" in England. Id. at 326-28. He concludes that, by the 
time of its adoption in American statutes in the 1860s, this expression had become a 
118 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:115 
sible because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of the 
state."15 While this definition accurately reflects the commonly ac­
cepted meaning of "under color of law" in American legal 
thought,16 it belies the difficulty courts have had in applying this 
concept to the facts of any given caseP 
The phrase "under color of law" appears more than fifty times 
in the current U.S. Code.18 Yet, the meaning of the phrase has been 
considered most often in the context of two civil rights statutes: 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil remedy for any deprivation of 
constitutional rights perpetrated "under color of law,"19 and its 
counterpart criminal provision, 18 U.S.c. § 242.20 Sections 242 and 
1983 were both enacted during the Reconstruction era?1 in 1866 
and 1870 respectively, to impose criminal and civil penalties on offi­
cials in the South who were depriving African Americans of their 
constitutional rights.22 The primary purpose of these statutes was 
term of art referring to actions of officials that appeared to be authorized but, in fact, 
were not. Id. 
15. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 282 (8th ed. 2004) [hereinafter BLACK'S]. This 
definition is almost identical to the definition of "under color of law" fashioned by the 
Court in United States v. Classic. See Classic, 313 U.S. at 326. 
16. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183-85 (1961), overruled in part by Monell 
v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (overruling the Monroe holding regarding 
liability for municipalities under § 1983, but leaving intact the definition of "under color 
of law"); Screws, 325 U.S. at 111; Classic, 313 U.S. at 326. 
17. Winter, supra note 12, at 327; see infra Part I.B (reviewing cases interpreting 
the phrase "under color of law"). 
18. This number is based on a search of the United States Code, in both Lexis and 
Westlaw databases, for the phrase "under color of law" in text segments of the Code. 
Each database located a slightly different number of statutes containing the phrase. 
However, a comparison of the two sets of results determined that the phrase "under 
color of law" appeared in the same fifty-three statutes in each database. 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, ... of any State or 
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
20. 18 U.S.c. § 242 (2000). This statute provides, in relevant part: "Whoever, 
under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any 
person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or pro­
tected by the Constitution or laws of the United States" will be subject to criminal 
penalties. Id. (emphasis added). 
21. The period of reorganization in the United States following the American 
Civil War. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1040 (11th ed. 2005) 
[hereinafter MERRIAM-WEBSTER]. 
22. See Richard H.W. Maloy, "Under Color or-What Does it Mean?, 56 MER. 
CER L. REV. 565, 571-72 (2005); Eric A. Harrington, Note, Judicial Misuse of History 
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to enforce the newly adopted Fourteenth Amendment and prevent 
the attempts of southern states to reestablish the pre-Civil War so­
cial order.23 This goal was recognized by the Court in Monroe v. 
Pape, which stated: 
[O]ne reason [§ 1983] was passed was to afford a federal right in 
federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, 
intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and 
the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and 
immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be 
denied by the state agencies.24 
It is in the context of these civil rights statutes, which aimed to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment against the states, that the 
common definition of the phrase "under color of law" has evolved 
in American law.25 This definition has been parsed out primarily by 
three Supreme Court cases interpreting §§ 242 and 1983-United 
States v. Classic,26 Screws v. United States,27 and Monroe v. Pape.28 
1. The Classic Definition 
The case of United States v. Classic gave the Supreme Court its 
first opportunity to consider the meaning of "under color of law" in 
18 U.S.c. § 242.29 In Classic, the defendants were charged with act­
ing "under color of law" to deprive citizens of their constitutional 
and § 1983: Toward a Purpose-Based Approach, 85 TEX. L. REV. 999, 1006 (2007) (Sec­
tion 1983 "targeted the [Ku Klux] Klan, including those members holding official posi­
tions in government. It aimed to break the rebellion, restore order to the South, and 
vindicate the rights of Freedmen."). 
23. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 934 n.17 (1982) (noting that in 
the debate, the bill was "described as a bill 'to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States' "); Winter, supra note 12, at 395 
("In Reconstruction, the concern with oppression under pretense of law ... confronted 
the attempt to subvert the post-War legal regime ...."); Adam S. Lurie, Note, Ganging 
Up on Police Brutality: Municipal Liability for the Unconstitutional Actions of Multiple 
Police Officers Under 42 U.S.c. § 1983,21 CARDOZO L. REV. 2087, 2091 (2000). 
24. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. 
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
25. See United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 
S. Ct. 495 (2006); Maloy, supra note 22, at 608-09; Seth M. Kean, Note, Municipal Lia­
bility for Off-Duty Police Misconduct Under Section 1983: The "Under Color of Law" 
Requirement, 79 B.U. L. REv. 195, 210-11 (1999); Libby, supra note 9, at 728. 
26. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941). 
27. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945). 
28. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183-85. 
29. See Classic, 313 U.S. at 308-09. The Court was actually interpreting the pre­
cursor to 18 U.S.c. § 242, which outlawed action taken "under color of any law" to 
deprive another of his rights under the "Constitution and laws of the United States." 
Id. at 309-10. 
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right to vote by altering ballots in the course of their official duties 
as commissioners of elections.30 The Court held that action taken 
"under color of law" is the "[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue 
of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is 
clothed with the authority of state law."31 In making this statement, 
the Court borrowed principles from earlier Fourteenth Amendment 
cases holding that, where an official uses his state-granted power in 
a manner that violates the Fourteenth Amendment, he is a state 
actor, whether or not the state actually authorized that specific 
act.32 
Intrinsic in the holdings of Classic and the Fourteenth Amend­
ment cases is that the actor must have some connection with the 
sovereign to be liable for depriving another of his constitutional 
rights.33 As one commentator stated: "[t]his connection with the 
sovereign is necessitated by the fact that there is no constitutional 
prohibition against an individual depriving another of his ... rights, 
and if the statutes are to be enforced against an individual, the indi­
vidual must be found connected to the sovereign in some fash­
ion."34 In Classic, it was the defendants' status as elections 
commissioners that connected them to the state and gave them the 
opportunity to alter the ballots and interfere with the citizens' right 
to vote.35 Because the commissioners were acting under the pre­
30. Id. at 307. 
31. Id. at 326 (emphasis added). 
32. See id. (citing Hague v. Comm. Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 507, 519 (1939); 
Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278,287 (1913); Ex parte Virginia, 100 
U.S. 339, 346 (1879)). 
33. See, e.g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 347 ("Whoever, by virtue of public 
position under a State government, deprives another" of due process or equal protec­
tion "as he acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the State's power, his 
act is that of the State."). 
34. Maloy, supra note 22, at 648; accord Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 
922, 936-37 (1982). 
Careful adherence to the "state action" requirement preserves an area of indi­
vidual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial power. 
It also avoids imposing on the State ... responsibility for conduct for which [it] 
cannot fairly be blamed .... 
Our cases have accordingly insisted that the conduct allegedly causing the 
deprivation of a federal right be fairly attributable to the State. 
Id. at 936-37. Professor Maloy ultimately concludes that the only thing clear about the 
expression "under color of law" in the civil rights statutes is that it is synonymous with 
state action. Maloy, supra note 22, at 646. 
35. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 325-26 (1941). 
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tense but beyond the scope of their state authority, their actions 
were deemed to have been taken "under color of law."36 
Four years later, in another § 242 case, the Court reiterated the 
definition of "under color of law" set out in Classic.37 In Screws v. 
United States, the Court affirmed the conviction of three Georgia 
police officers for beating an African American arrestee to death. 
Finding this case "indistinguishable" from Classic, the Court noted 
that "[i]n each [case] officers of the State were performing official 
duties; in each the power which they were authorized to exercise 
was misused. "38 
The Screws Court adopted the Classic interpretation of "under 
color of law," calling it the product of "mature consideration," not 
"hasty action or inadvertence."39 The Court added depth to the 
Classic rule saying: "[A]cts of officers in the ambit of their personal 
pursuits are plainly excluded. [But a ]cts of officers who undertake 
to perform their official duties are included whether they hew to 
the line of their authority or overstep it."40 By excluding action 
taken in the course of personal pursuits, this holding is consistent 
with the notion that an actor must have some connection to the 
state to be held accountable for interference with another's consti­
tutional rights.41 Therefore, because the goal of §§ 242 and 1983 is 
to prevent the deprivation of another's constitutional rights, the 
wrongdoer must be deemed a state actor to be held liable under 
those statutes.42 Finally, the Court noted that the Classic construc­
tion of "under color of law" will be precedent in this area of law 
unless Congress acts to change it.43 
36. See id. at 326. It is worth noting that the opinion examines the legislative 
history of § 242 to ensure that the qualification that a wrongful act was taken based on 
alienage, color, or race only applied to the second offense created by the statute and not 
to the deprivation of rights provision. [d. at 326-28. The Court concluded that the 
deprivation of rights provision applied regardless of the victim's alienage or color. Id. 
37. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109-12 (1945). 
38. Id. at 110. The police officers in this case were authorized by law to make the 
arrest and use the force necessary to affect it. Id. at 111. They acted without authority 
by using excessive force. Id. 
39. Id. at 112. 
40. Id. at 11I. 
41. See Maloy, supra note 22, at 648. 
42. See 18 U.S.c. § 242 (2000); 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (2000); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 
167,180 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); 
supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
43. Screws, 325 U.S. at 112-13. 
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2. The Monroe Application of the Classic Definition 
Twenty years after Classic was decided, its interpretation of 
"under color of law" was again affirmed, and extended to § 1983 
cases in Monroe v. Pape.44 The Court found that the Classic defini­
tion of "under color of law" satisfied the legislative purpose of 
§ 1983, and was intended to be a governing rule of law.45 In addi­
tion, the Court observed that it would only create uncertainty in the 
law if the meaning of "under color of law" was varied "to meet the 
exigencies of each case. "46 
The Court further noted that, in the time since the Classic and 
Screws decisions, Congress had revised the civil rights laws and en­
acted three new laws containing the phrase "under color of law" 
without any debate or fuss over the inclusion of that phrase.47 Spe­
cifically, the Court said: 
If the results of our construction of "under color of" law 
were as horrendous as now claimed . . . surely the voice of the 
opposition would have been heard in . . . Committee reports. 
Their silence and the new uses to which "under color of" law 
have recently been given reinforce our conclusion that our prior 
decisions were correct on this matter of construction.48 
For these reasons, the Monroe Court concluded that Classic 
provided the correct meaning of the phrase "under color of law" 
and that this definition would be used in future § 1983 cases.49 To 
date, the Classic definition has remained untouched by Congress or 
the Supreme Court.50 However, the existence of an established def­
44. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183-87. In Monroe, the plaintiff sued the Chicago Police 
Department and thirteen officers individually for deprivation of his civil rights when 
they entered Monroe's home without a warrant and detained him without charges or a 
hearing before a magistrate. Id. 
45. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184-85 (quoting Screws, 325 U.S. at 112-13). The Court, 
after a detailed examination of the legislative history of § 1983, concluded that Con­
gress intended § 1983 to remedy the harms caused by abuses of authority and, there­
fore, that the definition of "under color of law" as a misuse of power was consistent 
with the purposes of the statute. Id. at 172-83; see also Harrington, supra note 22, at 
1008. Sections 242 and 1983 were both enacted shortly after the Civil War with the 
intent to remedy the inequitable legal treatment of emancipated African Americans. 
See generally Maloy, supra note 22, at 569-84 (recounting the social and legislative his­
tory of §§ 242 and 1983). 
46. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 185 (quoting Screws, 325 U.S. at 113). 
47. Id. at 186. 
48. Id. at 187. 
49. Id. 
50. This is not to say that there has not been criticism of the Classic definition. 
See id. at 211-24 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); accord Eric H. Zagrans, "Under Color of' 
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inition of "under color of law" has not simplified application of the 
concept in § 242 and § 1983 cases.51 
B. 	 Application of "Under Color of Law" in § 242 and § 1983 
Cases 
This Section reviews the difficulty courts have had in applying 
the Classic definition of "under color of law" in § 242 and § 1983 
"personal capacity"52 cases.53 The Classic and Screws decisions 
mandate that the wrongful conduct in a § 242 or § 1983 case must 
rise to the level of state action before a penalty can be imposed for 
the deprivation of constitutional rights. 54 Because these statutes do 
not apply to a private individual, absent some connection to the 
sovereign, courts must be sure that the wrongdoer was acting under 
What Law: A Reconstructed Model of Section 1983 Liability, 71 VA. L. REV. 499 (1985) 
(arguing that the definition of "under color of law" applied in Monroe is wrong and that 
"under color of law" actually means authorized by law). In fact, there is still debate 
over the meaning of analogous phrases like "official capacity." See, e.g., Steven J. Mul­
roy, "Official" Explanation: Defining "Official Capacity" and Related "Color of Office" 
Phrases in Bribery and Extortion Law, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 587 (2008). This article 
does not specifically address the phrase "under color of law" or the standard by which it 
should be measured, but it does note vagueness in the scope of the phrase "official 
capacity." Id. at 589-90, 634-35 (arguing that the narrower meaning-that the action 
must be directly connected to the official duties-should be applied). 
51. See infra notes 173-180 and accompanying text for a discussion of the differ­
ence between interpretation and application. 
52. Professor Maloy notes that the Court has used the phrase "personal capacity" 
to describe § 1983 cases in which the wrongdoer is a private party acting with some type 
of state authority and distinguished them from "official capacity" cases, in which the 
wrongdoer is the state itself. Maloy, supra note 22, at 599-600. This distinction is im­
portant because in cases where the wrongdoer is a private individual, courts have the 
additional burden of determining whether the individual has a sufficient connection 
with the sovereign to make him a state actor under §§ 242 and 1983. 
53. See Douglas S. Miller, Off Duty, Off the Wall, But Not Off the Hook: Section 
1983 Liability for the Private Misconduct ofPublic Officials, 30 AKRON L. REV. 325,328 
(1997) ("That the lower federal courts are having trouble drawing the line between 
public and private conduct can hardly be denied."). This difficulty arises most often in 
cases where the state official was off duty at the time that the injury occurred. Libby, 
supra note 9, at 732-33 ("[L]ower courts have had difficulty applying Supreme Court 
'under color of law' principles and have implemented inconsistent approaches in re­
sponse to cases in which the actor is off duty."). Part of the difficulty for lower courts is 
that the definition of "under color of law" was developed by the Supreme Court in 
cases where the wrongdoers were clearly acting in the course of their official duties. 
See, e.g., Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169 (police officers conducting investigation); Screws v. 
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945) (police officers acting to affect arrest); United 
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 325-26 (1941) (commissioners of elections counting bal­
lots and reporting election results). The Court "has not addressed when an off-duty 
state official is acting under color of law." Libby, supra note 9, at 732. 
54. 	 Screws, 325 U.S. at 111; Classic, 313 U.S. at 326. 
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the actual or apparent authority of the state before finding that the 
action was taken "under color of law."55 
In order to determine whether a connection with the state ex­
ists, courts first have to determine what type of evidence they will 
use to measure the presence or absence of state authority: Should 
they consider objective manifestations of state authority,56 the sub­
jective intent of the actor to use her authority,57 the subjective per­
ception of the victim that the actor had authority,58 or some 
combination of the three?59 The remainder of this section reviews a 
sample of cases that highlight this question and courts' attempts to 
answer it. 
55. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982) ("Action by a 
private party pursuant to [§ 1983], without something more, [is] not sufficient to justify 
a characterization of that party as a 'state actor.' "). Courts have created many different 
tests to determine whether the necessary connection between the individual and the 
sovereign is present. See id. (listing several tests used to determine if a private party is a 
state actor, including the "public function" test, "state compulsion" test, "nexus" test, 
and "joint action" test); Zambrana-Marrero v. Suarez-Cruz, 172 F.3d 122, 125 (1st Cir. 
1999) ("totality of the circumstances" test); Pickrel v. City of Springfield, 45 F.3d 1115, 
1118 (7th Cir. 1995) (focusing on the nature of the act); Keller v. District of Columbia, 
809 F. Supp. 432, 436 (E.D. Va. 1993) ("outward indicia of state authority"); Miller, 
supra note 53, at 336-57. However, in the words of Justice Byron White, it would be 
impossible to formulate "an infallible test for determining whether the State ... has 
become significantly involved in private discriminations." Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 
369, 378 (1967). 
56. See, e.g., Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2001); Pitchell 
v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545 (2d Cir. 1994); Davis v. Lynbrook Police Dep't, 224 F. Supp. 2d 
463 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Samedi v. Miami-Dade County, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (S.D. Fla. 
2001). 
57. See, e.g., Keller, 809 F. Supp. at 435 (discounting the argument that subjective 
intent of the wrongdoer should be considered in an "under color of law" analysis). In 
Keller, the police-officer defendants argued that they could not be held liable under 
§ 1983 for detaining an individual outside of their jurisdiction because the officers did 
not believe that they were acting within the scope of their duties. Id. The court re­
jected that defense saying "[n]either reason nor precedent supports the argument that 
the 'under color of law determination should turn on the subjective understanding of 
the actor concerning the scope of his duties." Id. (emphasis added). Because the Tem­
ple concurrence only raises issues concerning a victim's subjective beliefs, this Note will 
not review cases discussing the role of the actor's subjective beliefs. See United States 
v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 142 (2d Cir. 2006) (Wesley, J., concurring), cen. denied, 127 S. 
Ct. 495 (2006). 
58. See, e.g., United States v. Giordano, 442 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2006); Zambrana­
Marrero, 172 F.3d at 122. 
59. For a good summary of the different objective and subjective concerns see 
Libby, supra note 9. 
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1. Objective Standard 
Logic dictates that in order for harm to be caused by the ac­
tor's official status, the victim must be aware of that status at the 
time of the act.60 However, many courts are uncomfortable using a 
subjective test "because it puts the 'color of law' question solely in 
the hands of the plaintiff."61 For example, the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit has stated definitively that to focus on the vic­
tim's reaction to the conduct, rather than the nature of the conduct 
itself, "misses the essence of the color of law requirement and the 
protection afforded by section 1983."62 Likewise, a Federal District 
Court in New York concluded that "under color of law" is an objec­
tive analysis and neither the victim's subjective understanding, nor 
the actor's subjective intent is relevant.63 
The concern is that if a court were to consider the plaintiff's 
sUbjective perception, the plaintiff would be able to create liability 
for a defendant engaged in purely personal pursuits that § 1983 was 
not meant to reach.64 Two recent § 1983 decisions demonstrate the 
approach taken by many courts-that subjective beliefs have no 
place in the "under color of law" analysis.65 
In Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, the Eleventh Circuit held that 
the city manager's rape of another city employee was made possible 
only by virtue of his government authority.66 In that case, the court 
60. See Miller, supra note 53, at 345-46. 
61. Id. at 346. Specifically, Miller raises concerns about defining what it means to 
perceive "action of the state." Id. at 345-46. He also addresses problems with the tem­
poral element: What if the plaintiff did not know the actor was vested with state author­
ity at the time of the incident but later finds out and testifies that he now perceives the 
conduct as some misuse of official authority? Id. 
62. Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 548-49 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting the plaintiff's 
argument that he would not have been shot by the off-duty police officer but for the 
plaintiff's subjective perception that he was safe because he was in "police presence"). 
63. Davis v. Lynbrook Police Dep't, 224 F. Supp. 2d 463, 476 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(denying defendant's motion for summary judgment because sufficient evidence was 
presented so that, even without considering the plaintiff's subjective belief, a reasonable 
jury could find action "under color of law"). 
64. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945). This is one of the con­
cerns raised by the Temple concurrence: "[E]ven where the official never mentions or 
uses ... her position as a government official, a victim's belief ... no matter how 
unreasonable, can result in liability for the defendant." United States v. Temple, 447 
F.3d 130, 142 (2d Cir. 2006) (Wesley, J., concurring), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 495 (2006); 
cf Libby, supra note 9, at 744 (observing a problem on the other end of the spectrum, 
that consideration of the plaintiff's subjective impression could allow a defendant who 
should be found to be acting "under color of law" to avoid § 1983 liability). 
65. Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2001); Samedi v. 
Miami-Dade County, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (S.D. Fla. 2001). 
66. Griffin, 261 F.3d at 1304-05. 
126 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:115 
relied on testimony of various witnesses as objective evidence that 
the manager had used his state-granted authority over the victim to 
create the opportunity to be alone with her on the occasion of the 
rape.67 Because there was objective testimony that the defendant's 
authority as a state official facilitated the wrongful act, the court 
found that he acted "under color of law" within the meaning of 
§ 1983.68 
Conversely, in Samedi v. Miami-Dade County, a sexual harass­
ment case brought under § 1983, a Federal District Court in Florida 
found that the defendants did not act "under color of law" where 
the plaintiff failed to present objective evidence of the wrongdoer's 
authority.69 In that case, despite the plaintiff's belief that the de­
fendants were her bosses, and the defendants' admissions that they 
made statements to that effect, the court found that the plaintiff did 
not present any objective evidence that the defendants "possessed 
... state authority with respect to [the] Plaintiff."70 Noting that 
there was no precedent to support the proposition "that a plaintiff's 
subjective belief as to a defendant's authority, without more, is suf­
ficient to establish that the defendant acted under color of law 
under section 1983," the court granted summary judgment for the 
defendants.71 
2. Subjective Standard 
Despite the prevalence of the objective approach, courts in 
several circuits have considered the role of a victim's subjective per­
ception in an "under color of law" analysis. In a § 1983 action 
against two off-duty police officers whose intervention in a bar fight 
led to the death of one fighter, the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit noted that "subjective reactions of the victim may have 
some relevance" in the "under color of law" analysis.72 Most re­
cently, despite the Second Circuit's clear dismissal of the role of 
67. Id. at 1303-05. 
68. Id. at 1305. 
69. Samedi, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 134l. 
70. Id. at 1340. 
71. Id. at 1339. 
72. Zambrana-Marrero v. Suarez-Cruz, 172 F.3d 122, 126 (1st Cir. 1999). How­
ever, the court went on to say that" 'the primary focus . .. must be on the conduct of 
the [actor], ... and whether [that conduct] 'related in some meaningful way ... to [his] 
governmental status or to the performance of his duties.'" Id. (emphasis added) (quot­
ing Barreto-Rivera v. Medina-Vargas, 168 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 1999); Martinez v. Colon, 
54 F.3d 980, 987 (1st Cir. 1995». 
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victims' subjective beliefs in Pitchell,73 the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit affirmed the conviction of the mayor of Waterbury, 
Connecticut, based on the victims' belief that he was invoking his 
official authority.74 
Mayor Philip Giordano was charged under § 242 with acting 
"under color of law" to deprive two girls of their constitutional 
rights when he sexually abused them.75 There was no objective evi­
dence that Giordano ever used his power as mayor to perpetrate 
the sexual assaults.76 However, both victims testified that they 
knew he was the mayor and thought that he had the power to "rule 
over everybody" and have them put in jaiL77 The court found that 
the victims' belief that Giordano could use his authority to harm 
them if they told on him was sufficient to find that "the abuse was 
made possible" because he had acted "under color of law."78 
The Giordano decision has revived uncertainty about the role 
that a victim's subjective understanding should play in the "under 
color of law" analysis.79 Considering that Temple was decided by 
the Second Circuit less than two months after Giordano,80 the Tem­
ple concurrence points out that these back-to-back decisions may 
be read to imply that subjective perceptions are significant to the 
"under color of law" inquiry.s1 However, because Temple was liti­
gated under § 7214(a), a statute created for a different purpose than 
§§ 242 or 1983, this implication is neither as weighty, nor as prob­
lematic, as the concurrence suggests. 
II. 26 U.S.c. § 7214(A) 
In 1868, Congress enacted what is now 26 U.S.c. § 7214, 
criminalizing certain conduct by federal employees acting in con­
73. Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545 (2d Cir. 1994); see supra text accompanying 
note 62 (summarizing facts of the Pitchell case). 
74. United States v. Giordano, 442 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2006). 
75. Id. at 34. 
76. Id. at 34-35 (finding no evidence that Giordano told the girls he was mayor in 
order to get them to perform the sex acts). 
77. Id. at 36 n.3. 
78. Id. at 47. 
79. See United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 141-45 (2d Cir. 2006) (Wesley, J., 
concurring), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 495 (2006). 
80. Id. at 130 (majority opinion) (Temple was decided on May 1, 2006); Gior­
dano, 442 F.3d at 30 (Giordano was decided on March 3, 2006). 
81. See Temple, 447 F.3d at 141 (Wesley, J., concurring). 
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nection with Internal Revenue laws.82 Section 7214(a) provides in 
relevant part: 
(a) Unlawful acts of revenue officers or agents. -Any officer or 
employee of the United States acting in connection with any rev­
enue law of the United States­
(1) who is guilty of any extortion or willful oppression under 
color of law; 
shaH be dismissed from office or discharged from employment 
and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than 
$10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both .... The 
court also shall render judgment against the said officer or em­
ployee for the amount of damages sustained in favor of the party 
injured, to be collected by execution.83 
Eva Temple was charged and convicted under this section of 
the statute.84 The next section examines the legislative history and 
judicial interpretations of § 7214(a) in order to provide an under­
standing of its purpose and context. 
A. Legislative History and Purpose of § 7214(a) 
The language of what is now § 7214(a) first appeared in the 
U.S. Code in 1868 as part of An Act Imposing Taxes on Distilled 
Spirits and Tobacco, and for Other Purposes.85 At that time, fed­
82. 26 U.s.c § 7214(a) (2000). Section 7214 contains three subsections: (a), (b), 
and (c). Subsection (b) provides penalties for revenue officers having a direct or indi­
rect interest in the manufacture of alcohol or tobacco. Id. § 7214(b). Subsection (c) is a 
cross reference to a repealed statute. Id. § 7214(c); S. REP. No. 85-2090, at 275 (1958), 
as reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.CA.N. 4395, 4395-97. Subsections (b) and (c) are of no 
consequence to the topic of this Note and will not be discussed further. 
83. 26 U.S.C § 7214(a). 
84. Temple, 447 F.3d at 134 (majority opinion). Subsection (1) is only the first of 
nine enumerated offenses under § 7214(a). Further offenses include: knowingly de­
manding "sums greater than are authorized by law"; knowingly receiving "fees" or 
"gifts" for the performance of duty or as "compromise, adjustment, or settlement of any 
... alleged violation of law"; failing to perform a duty of office with the intent to avoid 
application of Title 26; conspiring to or knowingly enabling another to "defraud the 
United States"; making a fraudulent entry in a book or statement; and failing to report 
knowledge of a violation of a revenue law. 26 U.S.C § 7214(a)(2)-(9). However, this 
Note focuses solely on the first offense in § 7214(a), the only one that requires action to 
be taken "under the color of law." 
85. An Act Imposing Taxes on Distilled Spirits and Tobacco, and for Other Pur­
poses, ch. 186, § 98, 15 Stat. 125,165 (1868) (codified at 26 U.S.c. § 7214(a». The text 
of § 7214(a)(1) has changed very little in the 140 years since its enactment. Temple, 447 
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eral taxation was still in its early stages of development.86 In 1862, 
in order to finance the Civil War, President Lincoln signed a law 
creating the first income tax.87 This law also created the office of 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and granted "the Commis­
sioner the power to assess, levy, and collect taxes, and the right to 
enforce the law through seizure and prosecution. "88 The law al­
lowed for the assignment of a collector, assessor, and deputies in 
each of 185 districts in the country to assist the Commissioner in 
carrying out his responsibilities.89 By January of 1863, a total of 
3882 persons had been appointed to these positions.9° 
By 1868, taxation of distilled spirits and tobacco had become 
the federal government's main source of revenue, providing almost 
ninety percent of the country's income.91 Therefore, Congress took 
quick action when it discovered widespread fraud in the collection 
of taxes on distilled spirits.92 On January 7, 1868, Representative 
Robert C. Schenck of Ohio, representing the Committee of Ways 
and Means, informed the House that because "such enormous 
frauds ha[d] been committed," in the previous year alone, the gov­
ernment had lost $70,000,000 in revenue from the distilled spirits 
tax.93 Representative Schenck reported that the primary reason 
this fraud had been achieved was: 
F.3d at 143 n.4 (Wesley, J., concurring) ("The language of modern day 26 U.S.c. 
§ 7214(a)(1) is almost identical to its original, 1868, formulation ...."). 
86. Because the United States revolution against England was caused, in part, by 
a dispute over taxes, there was great reluctance to give taxation power to the central 
government of the new country. THE AMERICAN WAY IN TAXATION: INTERNAL REVE· 
NUE, 1862-1963, at 16 (Lillian Doris ed., 1963) [hereinafter AMERICAN WAY]; see also 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION: HISTORY OF TAXATION, 
ORGANIZATION OF THE IRS, FUNcnONS WITHIN THE IRS (1990) [hereinafter HISTORY 
OF TAXATION]. The first federal tax was not levied until 1791 and only on particular 
goods. 
87. AMERICAN WAY, supra note 86, at 19. A few earlier attempts at taxation 
were primarily taxes on commodities, like alcohol and slaves, or sales taxes, but not on 
income. Id. at 17-18. 
88. [d. at 31; HISTORY OF TAXATION, supra note 86. 
89. AMERICAN WAY, supra note 86, at 32. 
90. [d. 
91. [d. at 19. The 1862 Act creating income tax originally permitted tax collection 
from a greater variety of sources but Congress eliminated many of them at the end of 
the Civil War. Id. 
92. See CONGo GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 364, 364-66, 380-450 (1868). 
93. See id. at 364. Specifically, Representative Schenck reported that, based on 
the known amount of whiskey production, at least $100,000,000 a year should have been 
collected through the distilled spirits tax, but in fact the government was receiving less 
than $30,000,000 each year. Id. This was a huge amount of money in 1868. If the same 
fraud occurred in 2007, the government would have lost $1,078,031,783.18. See The 
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the want of integrity, character, and honesty in the various 
subordinate agents of the Government scattered throughout the 
country who are charged with the collection of the revenues .... 
[T]here is no fraud committed in ... the tax upon distilled spirits 
... which would materially affect the revenue in any instance, 
except it be done with the connivance of some official, except it 
be by collusion between him and the party interested in the 
fraud. The reason is this: instead of men being selected because 
of their character, capacity and fitness ... they are selected for 
other causes, upon recommendations based upon other reasons 
in too many cases.94 
Because the country was losing so much money, Congress 
passed an emergency measure in January of 1868 to address fraud 
by changing the process of tax assessment on spirits.95 Meanwhile, 
the Committee of Ways and Means continued to work on a larger 
bill addressing general problems within the internal revenue 
system.96 
This larger bill, introduced in June of 1868, included the lan­
guage of what would become § 7214(a). It provided "[t]hat if any 
officer or agent appointed and acting under the authority ofany rev­
enue law of the United States shall be guilty of any extortion or 
willful oppression, under color of law" he would be dismissed from 
office and found guilty of a misdemeanor.97 The penalties for con­
viction under this section included a fine between $1000 and $5000 
and imprisonment of at least six months, but not more than three 
years.98 This provision passed through the Senate without amend­
ment99 and was signed into law by President Andrew Johnson on 
July 28, 1868.100 
Since 1868, the only substantive change to the language of 
§ 7214(a) occurred with the 1954 recodification of the Internal Rev­
enue Code.lOl The 1954 Code increased the penalties for offenses 
Inflation Calculator, http://www.westegg.comlinflation! (last visited Mar. 15, 2009) 
(enter initial amount $70,000,000, initial year 1868, final year 2007). 
94. CONGo GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 364 (1868). 
95. Id. at 364-66. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 3503 (emphasis added). 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 3772. 
100. Id. at 4334-35, 4381. 
101. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 75, § 7214, 68A Stat. 3, 856 (1954) (codi­
fied at 26 U.S.C. § 7214 (2000». Prior to 1954, the original 1868 Act went through two 
other recodifications-neither of which made any substantive changes to the language 
of the Act. See Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 4047(e), 53 Stat. 1,497 (1939) 
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by revenue employees, capping the fines at $10,000 and the possible 
prison sentence at five years.102 More importantly, Congress 
changed the preamble of the statute, broadening its applicability to 
reach "any officer or employee of the United States acting in con­
nection with any revenue law," rather than "any officer or agent ap­
pointed and acting under the authority of any revenue law," as the 
statute originally read.103 Though the House and Senate reports do 
not discuss the reason for this change,104 the new language allows 
all federal employees, not just those employed by the IRS,105 to be 
prosecuted under the statute if they act in connection with an Inter­
nal Revenue law.106 The language of § 7214(a) in the most recent 
publication of the Code is identical to the language of the 1954 
(changing the location, but not the effect of the Act's language in the Code); Revised 
Statutes § 3196, 1 Rev. Stat. 609 (1875) (rearranging the last two sentences of the Act); 
see also H.R. REP. No. 76-6, at 1-3 (1939) (noting that the 1939 Code merely relocated 
the language of the 1868 Act into Subtitle E, Personnel Procedures, § 4047, Penalties of 
the Internal Revenue Code, but did not change the effect of the law). Despite the 
relocation and minor changes to language in these three recodifications, present-day 
§ 7214(a) is still very similar to the original language of the statute in 1868. Compare 26 
U.S.c. § 7214(a), with An Act Imposing Taxes on Distilled Spirits and Tobacco, and for 
Other Purposes, ch. 186, § 98, 15 Stat. 125,165 (1868) (codified at 26 U.S.c. § 7214(a) 
(2000)). 
102. Compare with penalties in the original bill discussed supra in text accompa­
nying note 98. The reason for this change was to make IRS employee penalties "corre­
spond to the penalties imposed in the case of offenses by taxpayers generally." STAFF 
OF J. COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 830 CONG., SUMMARY OF H.R. 8300: 
THE PROPOSED INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF REP­
RESENTATIVES 85 (Comm. Print 1954). The penalties described above were the same 
for all taxpayer offenses under the new code. Id. 
103. H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, at 287 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 
4575 (emphasis added); S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 329 (1954), reprinted in 1954 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 5254-55 (second and fourth emphasis added); see supra text accom­
panying note 97 (quoting language of original Act). 
104. See H.R. REP. No. 83-1337; S. REp. No 83-1622. 
105. The meaning of "officer or employee of the United States" is plain. It in­
cludes any individual employed by the federal government, from the president to a 
postal worker. In theory, after 1954, an individual need not be employed specifically by 
the IRS to be subject to the provisions of § 7214(a). See Internal Revenue Code of 
1954, § 7214 (reading "any ... employee of the United States"). 
106. See United States v. Johnson, 398 F.2d 29, 31-32 (7th Cir. 1968). The only 
other changes in the 1954 recodification altered the specific offenses so that each ex­
pressly requires knowledge or intent of the actor as part of the criminal conduct, and 
completely removed subdivision (7) of § 4047(e) of the 1939 Code, which provided an 
offense where the employee acted negligently. H.R. REP. No. 83-1337; S. REp. No. 83­
1622. These changes were made to ensure that offenses under this statute involve some 
intentional misconduct "as distinguished from the mere negligent or other improper 
conduct of an employee, not involving criminal intent, which could continue to be han­
died ... by reprimand or dismissal or other action under the civil service laws." H.R. 
REp. No. 83-1337, at 287. 
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recodification.107 Today, as long as the individual is employed by 
the federal government and has acted in connection with a revenue 
law, she is subject to liability for engaging in any of the enumerated 
offenses of § 7214(a).108 
B. Judicial Interpretation of § 7214(a) 
Though the language of § 7214(a) has been in force since 1868, 
it has not received much judicial attention.109 The Supreme Court 
has referenced the statute in only two reported decisions, neither of 
which addresses the substance of § 7214(a).110 However, lower fed­
eral court decisions interpreting this statute have highlighted three 
important functions of § 7214(a): to set a standard of conduct for 
government employees; to regulate action taken in connection with 
revenue laws; and to provide a criminal cause of action against em­
ployees who abuse their authority. 
1. High Standard of Conduct for Government Employees 
Congress enacted § 7214(a) to remedy the widespread miscon­
duct of Internal Revenue agents by defining conduct for which 
agents would be penalized.1 11 In doing so, Congress effectively cre­
ated a code of conduct for Internal Revenue agents. This code 
holds employees of the government to a higher standard of conduct 
than persons employed by private entities.H2 An early interpreta­
tion of § 7214(a)113 recognized that the statute provided more se­
vere punishment for an officer of the government because it is the 
107. Compare 26 U.S.c. § 7214 (2000), with Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 
75, § 7214, 68A Stat. 3, 856 (1954). 
108. Cf United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398,409-10 (1999) (dis­
cussing § 7214 as part of an overall regulatory scheme to prevent "self-enriching ac­
tions" by government employees). 
109. A search of Westlaw revealed only 114 federal court opinions over a fifty 
year period, 1957-2007, that even mention 26 U.S.c. § 7214(a). (Search op("26 U.S.c." 
Is "7214(a)") in District Court and Federal Appeals Court combined databases) (last 
searched October 10, 2008). 
110. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. at 410 (referencing § 7214(a)(9) only as 
part of an overall statutory scheme against bribery of federal officials); Standefer v. 
United States, 447 U.S. 10, 11-14 (1980) (reviewing conviction of an individual for aid­
ing and abetting an IRS agent in accepting gifts; the agent was acquitted of charges of 
accepting gifts in violation of § 7214(a)(2». 
111. See discussion infra notes 191-195 and accompanying text. 
112. See United States v. McDonald, 26 F. Cas. 1085, 1085 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1876) 
(No. 15,670) (holding that, unlike "private individual[s]," government officials have a 
"special[,] honorable obligation to protect the government" and thus "are held to a 
more rigid [standard of] accountability"). 
113. [d. (interpreting Revised Statute § 3169, a precursor to the modern § 7214). 
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duty of the officer to protect the government, and certainly not to 
commit offenses against it himself.l14 Significantly, the court stated: 
"those who have a trust reposed in them, are held to a more rigid 
accountability than others, and a violation of that trust is punished 
more severly [sic] when committed by them than where no such 
special trust is reposed."1l5 
This theme is repeated in modern cases interpreting § 7214(a), 
such as United States v. Stern.116 In Stern, the Second Circuit up­
held the conviction of an Internal Revenue employee under 
§ 7214(a) for making a false statement to the IRS during its audit of 
his personal tax returns.117 In affirming Stern's conviction under 
§ 7214(a)(7), the court held, in no uncertain terms, that "[s]ection 
7214 imposes sanctions on revenue agents for departures from the 
high standards of conduct demanded of those holding that of­
fice."118 As an employee of the IRS, Stern violated the high stan­
dard of conduct expected of him by intentionally providing false 
information to the IRS.119 
The judicial interpretation of § 7214(a), as a standard for be­
havior of federal employees, comports with the intent of the draft­
ers to impose sanctions on agents who acted without integrity.120 
The standard of conduct established by § 7214(a) has endured for 
the past 130 years.121 Not only has it survived, but Congress broad­




116. United States v. Stern, 418 F.2d 198, 199 (2d Cir. 1969); see also Hartline v. 
Clary, 141 F. Supp. 151,158 (E.D.S.C. 1956) (holding that § 4047(e), the identical pre­
cursor to § 7214(a), imposed a statutory duty on Internal Revenue agents to perform 
not only their duties under the law but to act in all matters relating to Internal Revenue 
laws and regulations). 
117. Stern, 418 F.2d at 198-99. 
118. Id. at 199. 
119. The court also found it unimportant that, in relation to the audit of his per­
sonal finances, Stern was acting outside the scope of his employment at the IRS when 
he made the false statement. Id. 
120. See CONGo GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 364 (1868); discussion supra text 
accompanying notes 92-95. This judicial interpretation is further supported by policies 
of the IRS itself that seek to "assure the maintenance of the highest standards of hon­
esty, integrity, loyalty, security, and conduct among Service employees." AMERICAN 
WAY, supra note 86, at 204. 
121. See supra notes 101-108 and accompanying text (noting that the language of 
§ 7214(a) has remained virtually unchanged since 1868). 
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2. Action "in Connection with Revenue Laws" 
The 1954 recodification of the Internal Revenue Code 
amended § 7214(a) to apply to "any officer or employee of the 
United States," acting "in connection with" a revenue law.122 The 
preamble of § 7214(a) plainly designates the group that is subject to 
its provisions: employees of the United States.123 Further, 
§ 7214(a) does not require that the employee act under the author­
ity of a revenue law, or in the course of his employment duties, but 
only that he act in connection with a revenue law of the United 
States.124 
Though this requirement was clear from the revised language 
of § 7214(a), it did represent a change from the earlier version of 
the statute,125 and defendants continued to argue that the statute 
only applied to actions taken in the performance of some official 
duty under the revenue laws.126 For example, in United States v. 
Stern, after being charged under § 7214(a) for making a false state­
ment to the IRS, Stern argued that he was acting as a private citi­
zen, not in his capacity as an IRS employee, when he made the 
statement.127 However, the court found it irrelevant that the mis­
122. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 75, § 7214, 68A Stat. 3, 856 (1954) (codi­
fied at 26 U.S.C § 7214 (2000)) (emphasis added); H. R. REP. No. 83-1337, at 287 
(1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.CA.N. 4017, 4575 (noting the specific. words and 
phrases changed by the 1954 Act). 
123. Stern, 418 F.2d at 199 ("The preamble merely designates generally which 
Government employees are under the section."). 
124. 26 U.S.C § 7214(a) (2000) ("Any officer or employee of the United States 
acting in connection with any revenue law of the United States ...."). Section 7214 
"does not require that [the defendant) be acting under authority of the revenue laws." 
United States v. Johnson, 398 F.2d 29, 31 (7th Cir. 1968); see infra note 136 and accom­
panying text. 
125. See Williams v. United States, 168 U.S. 382, 387-88 (1897) (holding that 
under Revised Statute § 3169, an earlier version of § 7214, prosecution against a Trea­
sury Department customs inspector could not be upheld because the statute applied 
only to officers or agents "appointed and acting under the authority of any revenue 
law"). In this case, the inspector was (1) not appointed under a revenue law but under 
acts of Congress to regulate unlawful entry of Chinese into the United States; and (2) 
the Chinese Exclusion Acts, that he was to enforce, had no relation to Internal Reve­
nue laws. Id.; see also supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text (discussing the one 
substantive language change to § 7214(a) in 1954). 
126. See Stern, 418 F.2d at 198-99 (arguing that § 7214(a) only operates where the 
acts were committed in the performance of a revenue officer's duties); Johnson, 398 
F.2d at 31 (arguing that § 7214(a) does not apply where the activities in question were 
performed after hours and outside of his duties as an IRS employee). 
127. Stern, 418 F.2d at 198-99. 
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conduct occurred outside of the officer's official duties, as long as it 
occurred while the wrongdoer was a revenue agent.128 
In Stern, the Second Circuit also used principles of statutory 
interpretation to support its construction of § 7214(a)(7).129 First, it 
relied on the presumption against redundancy:13o because several 
subsections of § 7214(a) specifically provided that the wrongful act 
must be committed in the course of official duties, it would be re­
dundant to read that language into the preamble.l3l Second, the 
court noted that three other provisions of § 7214(a) that had con­
tained a "performance of duty" requirement in an earlier version of 
the statute retained that language in the current version, and, there­
fore, Congress's omission of this phrase from subsection (7) must 
have been intentional.132 Consequently, the Court held that 
§ 7214(a) was intended to reach activities in connection with reve­
nue laws, whether or not in the course of official duties. As a result, 
by providing a false statement to the IRS regarding his personal 
finances, Stern was acting in connection with a revenue law under 
the meaning of the statute, even though he was not acting in the 
course of his duties for the IRS.133 
Likewise, in 1968, Internal Revenue employee Thomas John­
son was convicted of willfully aiding the preparation of materially 
false income tax returns under § 7214(a)(4).134 Despite the fact 
that preparing tax returns was not part of Johnson's official du­
ties,135 the court sustained his conviction, stating: "He was charged 
with acting in connection with the revenue laws and he was so act­
ing in preparing returns even if he did so away from his office and 
after regular working hours."136 This case also demonstrates that 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 199. 
130. See RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHARON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY IN· 
TERPRETATION: THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT 84-86 (2002) (statutes should 
be construed so that every word is valuable and not redundant or duplicative); see also 
infra notes 206-207 and accompanying text (discussing why it is correct to apply the 
principle against redundancy to § 7214). 
131. Stern, 418 F.2d at 199; see also 26 U.S.c. § 7214(a)(2) (2000) (receiving fees 
for the performance of any duty); id. § 7214 (a)(3) (failing to perform any duty with the 
intent to defeat IRS laws). 
132. Stern, 418 F.2d at 199. 
133. Id. at 198-99. 
134. United States v. Johnson, 398 F.2d 29, 30 (7th Cir. 1968). 
135. Id. (as an examiner for the IRS, Johnson was responsible for checking ques­
tionable exemptions and supervising junior personnel). 
136. Id. at 31 (emphasis added). 
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courts have freely applied § 7214(a) to actions of federal employees 
taken in a purely personal capacity. 
3. 	 Section 7214(a) Does Not Create a Private Cause of 
Action 
The final clause of § 7214(a) sets forth criminal penalties for an 
offense under the statute.137 It also provides that the court "shall 
render judgment against the ... employee for the amount of dam­
ages sustained in favor of the party injured."138 This language has 
been interpreted to mean that damages are not available to the in­
jured party until after a criminal conviction has been obtained 
under this section,139 As recently as 2007, the Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit dismissed complaints under several provisions of 
§ 7214(a), holding that it is a "criminal statute[] that do[es] not pro­
vide for a private right of action and [is] not enforceable through a 
civil action."140 
The foregoing cases summarize the current judicial construc­
tion of § 7214(a) as a criminal penalty against federal government 
employees who, when acting in connection with revenue laws of the 
United States, breach the high standard of conduct imposed on 
them by virtue of their employment. 
C. 	 "Under Color of Law" in § 7214(a): United States v. Deaver 
United States v. Deaver sets out jury instructions in the first 
known trial to construe the language of § 7214(a)(1).141 Though 
137. 26 U.S.c. § 7214(a) (2000) (dismissal from office and fines of up to $10,000, 
up to five years in prison, or both). 
138. 26 U.S.c. § 7214(a). 
139. United States v. Overton, 44 F. App'x 932, 933-34 (10th Cir. 2002) (dis­
missing taxpayer's suit under § 7214(a) because taxpayers cannot receive damages until 
criminal conviction under § 7214(a) has been obtained); Brunwasser v. Jacob, 453 F. 
Supp. 567, 572-73 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (dismissing civil suit for damages as invalid cause of 
action under § 7214(a»; see also Detwiler v. United States, 406 F. Supp. 695, 700 (E.D. 
Pa. 1975) ("[I]t is the intent of Congress that injury to individuals resulting from 'willful 
oppression under color of law' [by] officers or employees of the Revenue Service are to 
be redressed by criminal action brought by the United States. Accordingly, 26 U.S.c. 
§ 7214 has no relevancy in this suit" by a private individuaL). 
140. ANDREWS V. HEATON, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007) (dismissing a 
father's complaints under § 7214(a)(1), (2), (7), and (8) resulting from an investigation 
by the Department of Human Services). 
141. United States v. Deaver, 14 F. 595, 596-603 (W.D.N.C. 1882). Unfortu­
nately, this opinion only contains jury instructions and gives neither the facts of the case 
nor its outcome. Id. 
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this opinion is over a century 01d,142 it is the only case on record to 
discuss the application of the phrase "under color of law" in the 
context of § 7214(a) prior to the Temple decision.143 In Deaver, the 
judge instructed the jury that officers of the revenue service "can­
not rightfully do any act which is not authorized by law, under color 
of office."144 Therefore, the judge instructed that if the jury found 
that the defendant acted without, or in excess ofhis actual authority, 
under the guise of carrying out his official duties, then the defen­
dant would be guilty of action "under color of law."145 The judge in 
Deaver defined· the expression "under color of law" in the same 
way as it is defined in Classic146-action taken under the deceptive 
appearance of some state authority-but does not give his reason­
ing for that definition or the method by which it should be applied. 
The legislative history and cases discussed in this Part provide 
a comprehensive interpretation of the meaning and purpose of 
§ 7214(a) generally. However, this Part also reveals a lack of con­
gressional or judicial discussion of the meaning of the phrase 
"under color of law" or how that phrase should be applied in 
§ 7214(a) cases. It is against this backdrop that the Temple case was 
decided. 
III. THE TEMPLE DECISION 
The Temple case provides a factual context in which to ex­
amine whether a victim's subjective perceptions should be consid­
ered in a § 7214(a) "under color of law" analysis. After being 
arrested at work in the New York City IRS office, Temple 
142. This case is still good law in the sense that it has not been expressly or im­
pliedly overruled or abrogated, and has been positively cited to as recently as 2007. See 
Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2606 (2007) (citing Deaver for its definition of 
extortion). 
143. Deaver, 14 F. at 596-601. The cases discussed supra Parts II.B.l-.2 provide 
judicial interpretations of the entirety of § 7214( a) or of subsections other than (a)(1). 
None of the previously discussed cases specifically interprets subsection (a)(l), which 
contains the phrase "under color of law." 
144. Id. at 602. 
145. Id. at 599. As to count one, the judge instructed the jury that the defendant 
may be found guilty if he misrepresented circumstances to his superiors to get authori­
zation to use force more excessive than necessary. Id. As to count two, the jury was 
instructed that the defendant could be found guilty of acting "under the color of law" 
when he "destroy[ed] the still of John Wortman" if he did so prior to a judicial decree 
condemning the property and thus was "without authority of law" to destroy it. Id. at 
600 (emphasis added). Finally, on count three, the jury could find the defendant guilty 
if it found that he collected sums before they were due, again acting under the appear­
ance of but without authority of law. Id. at 601. 
146. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941). 
138 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:115 
threatened to initiate audits of the arresting officers' personal tax 
returns.147 Having witnessed Temple's belligerent and threatening 
behavior,148 the detectives were concerned that she might carry out 
these threats and they reported her actions to the U.S. Treasury 
Department.149 Their report resulted in Temple's prosecution 
under § 7214(a).150 
Though Temple was convicted by a jury, the district court judge 
granted her motion for acquittal, holding that there was insufficient 
evidence for the jury to have concluded that she acted "under color 
of law."151 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
unanimously reinstated Temple's conviction, holding that there was 
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that she acted 
"under color of law."152 However, while the judges were unani­
mous in the result, the majority and concurrence disagreed as to 
whether "under color of law" should be measured subjectively or 
objectively. 
A. The Majority Opinion 
The majority, acknowledging that this was a case of first im­
pression under § 7214(a), began its analysis by looking at § 242 and 
§ 1983 case law.153 It stated that "tests established [in § 242 and 
§ 1983 cases] are helpful in determining whether an action is taken 
under color of federal law."154 The court adopted the civil rights 
statutes' definition of "under color of law": "[0]ne who abuses a 
position given to him or her by the government is said to act under 
color of law."155 
147. United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 132-33 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 
S. Ct. 495 (2006). 
148. See id. at 132-33. Temple began to flail and curse at the detectives as they 
escorted her out of the IRS building. [d. She attempted to get out of the squad car. Id. 
After being handcuffed, she continued to curse at the detectives and was yelling that 
this was a racial conspiracy against her. Id. She kicked Detective Montes as he rode 
with her in the back of the car and continued the physical and verbal abuse at the police 
station. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 134. 
151. Id. at 135 (citing United States v. Temple, 342 F. Supp. 2d 233, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004), rev'd, 447 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
152. See id. at 130. 
153. Id. at 137-38. 
154. Id. The court acknowledged that §§ 242 and 1983 dealt with action under 
the color of state law but found them helpful in its analysis nonetheless. Id. 
155. Id. at 138 (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49-50 (1988)); see supra Part 
I.A. (reviewing the Court's construction of "under color of law" in §§ 242 and 1983). 
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Once it ascertained the meaning of "under color of law," the 
majority applied the phrase to the specific facts of the Temple case. 
Though the majority never expressly stated that it was relying on 
the detectives' subjective perceptions to determine that Temple ac­
ted "under color of law," this fact can be inferred from the opinion. 
The majority looked at Temple's authority as it was perceived by 
the detectives at the time the threats were made.156 The majority 
explicitly rejected the district court's contention that the detectives 
should not have believed Temple's threats because of facts that 
came to light after the threats were made.157 Instead, the court held 
that because the detectives had no reason to doubt that Temple 
would follow through at the time the threats were made, the detec­
tives' subjective impression that they would be audited demon­
strated a misuse of authority by Temple.158 
Further, the majority justified its conclusion by noting that in 
Giordano, the victims' subjective belief in their attacker's state au­
thority, even without a specific threat under the guise of that au­
thority, was sufficient to determine that he acted "under color of 
law."159 The majority also noted that subjecting Temple to penal­
ties under § 7214(a) was consistent with the purpose of the statute 
to "'impose[ ] sanctions on revenue agents for departure[ ] from the 
high standards of conduct demanded by those holding that 
office.' "160 
B. The Concurring Opinion 
The concurrence expressed concern that the majority opinion 
would be read to allow a victim's subjective perception of authority 
to control an "under color of law" analysis, particularly when read 
156. See Temple, 447 F.3d at 138. 
157. Id. at 138-39. The district court held that a reasonable jury could not find 
that Temple had acted under the color of law because she did not in fact have the ability 
to initiate an audit. Temple, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 239-40. It also found that the detectives 
should not have believed Temple because she made statements at the police station that 
had caused the detectives to question her mental capacity. Id. at 240. However, be­
cause these facts were not known to the detectives at the time Temple threatened them, 
the Court of Appeals held that they had no bearing on the "under color of law" analy­
sis. Temple, 447 F.3d at 138-39; see also Miller, supra note 53, at 346 (arguing that an 
"under color of law" violation should be based on what is known when the wrongful act 
occurs). 
158. Temple, 447 F.3d at 138-39. 
159. Id. at 139; see supra text accompanying notes 74-78 (reviewing the Giordano 
decision). 
160. Temple, 447 F.3d at 139 (quoting United States v. Stem, 418 F.2d 198, 199 
(2d Cir. 1969)). 
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in conjunction with the Giordano decision.161 Specifically, it ar­
gued: "There is no basis for allowing subjective impressions, beliefs, 
or fears to cloud, much less drive, color-of-Iaw analysis, and doing 
so will make consistent application of color-of-Iaw statutes in this 
Circuit difficult, if not impossible."162 The concern was that reli­
ance on a victim's subjective belief would allow liability to attach in 
the absence of any official status of the actor.163 The concurrence 
asserted that if a defendant's position and behavior as a public offi­
cial are no longer essential to determining the applicability of the 
phrase "under color of law," liability under these statutes would be 
unpredictable, and any distinction between official action and per­
sonal pursuits would be eliminated.l64 
The concurring opinion did not take issue with the majority's 
adoption of the Classic definition of "under color of law," but con­
tended that some objective manifestation of authority should be re­
quired to render action "under color of law."165 The concurrence's 
position is supported by case law, specifically Pitchell v. Callan,166 
which held that focusing on the victim's subjective reaction" 'misses 
the essence'" of the "under color of law" requirement.167 How­
ever, the concurrence relied exclusively on § 242 and § 1983 case 
law to reach this conclusion and did not consider the role of subjec­
tive beliefs in the context of § 7214(a).168 
By failing to consider the history and purpose of § 7214(a) and 
the judicial interpretations of other provisions of § 7214(a), the con­
currence did not accurately apply the phrase "under color of law" 
in the context of § 7214(a). The last section of this Note argues 
that, given the particular purpose of § 7214(a), it is appropriate to 
161. Id. at 141 (Wesley, J., concurring). 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 144. See generally supra Part I.A.l (reviewing early interpretations of 
the phrase "under color of law" that required an actor to have some connection to the 
state to be held liable for the wrongful conduct under §§ 242 and 1983). 
164. Temple, 447 F.3d at 142 (Wesley, J., concurring). 
165. See id. at 141 ("I do not quarrel with much of the majority opinion, including 
[the conclusion that Temple acted "under color of law"], but I would hold that Temple's 
threats were under the color of law without regard to the detectives' subjective beliefs 
or fears. "). 
166. Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545 (2d Cir. 1994). 
167. Temple, 447 F.3d at 144 (Wesley, J., concurring) (quoting Pitchell, 13 F.3d at 
549). 
168. Id. at 143-44. The concurring opinion does acknowledge that there is little 
case law regarding § 7214(a)(I) and that the language of § 7214(a) has remained un­
changed since 1868, but it does not look into the purpose of the statute any further. See 
id. 
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consider the subjective view of the victim in a § 7214(a) "under 
color of law" analysis. 
IV. SUBJECfIVE ANALYSIS IS ApPROPRIATE UNDER § 7214 
The key issue identified by the Temple concurrence is whether, 
when considering a statute that requires action to be taken "under 
color of law," courts should use an objective or subjective standard 
to measure the requisite misuse of authority.169 This Analysis ar­
gues that applying a subjective standard of "under color of law" in 
§ 7214(a) cases achieves a result consistent with the purposes of the 
statute and does not cause the problems associated with reliance on 
a subjective standard in § 242 and § 1983 casesPo While the phrase 
"under color of law" can be defined consistently across statutes in 
which it appears, it should be applied in light of the unique pur­
poses of the statute before the court.l7l As it is used in § 7214(a), 
"under color of law" may be defined consistently with §§ 242 and 
1983 as a misuse of power made possible because the actor has au­
thority of law, but unlike §§ 242 and 1983, can be applied using a 
purely subjective measure. Further, this Analysis contends that the 
concerns raised by the concurring opinion in Temple are misplaced 
because they focus on the problems caused by using a purely sub­
jective measure of "under color of law" in § 242 and § 1983 cases, 
169. See id. at 141; see also Libby, supra note 9 (highlighting the fact that this 
debate over the use of an objective or subjective standard is common among courts 
considering any statute containing the phrase "under color of law"). 
170. The author does not mean to suggest that the courts must use an exclusively 
subjective standard in § 7214. A purely objective standard, or some combination of 
objective and subjective measures could also theoretically satisfy the purposes of 
§ 7214(a). However, because this Note is focused on rebutting the contention of the 
Temple concurrence that a purely subjective standard should never be used, the focus of 
this Analysis will be on the suitability of applying a subjective standard. 
171. There are two concepts of statutory interpretation that are essential to this 
Analysis. The first is that courts have a duty to both interpret and apply statutes in light 
of the statute's particular goals, and that there is a difference between these two func­
tions. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, USING AND MISUSING LEGIS­
LATIVE HISTORY: A RE-EvALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 37-39 (1989) [hereinafter USING AND MISUSING LEGIS­
LATIVE HISTORY]. The second concept is that every statute has an individualized his­
tory and purpose, and courts must recognize the unique context of the statute they are 
interpreting, and then apply it in a way that achieves that purpose. See ABNER J. 
MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND TIlE 
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 1-2 (1997); Moffatt Hancock, Fallacy of the Transplanted Cate­
gory, 37 CAN. B. REV. 535, 549-51 (1959); infra notes 189-195 and accompanying text 
(discussing contextualism and examining the context and purpose of § 7214(a»; see gen­
erally BROWN & BROWN, supra note 130 (discussing the distinction between application 
and interpretation). 
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and fail to recognize that the same problems do not exist in the 
context of § 7214(a).172 
A. Interpretation of "Under Color of Law" in § 7214(a) 
When deciding any case involving a statute, it is the court's 
duty to both interpret and apply the statutory language.173 Though 
the distinction between interpretation and application is subtle, it is 
vital to the constitutional principle of separation of powers.174 In­
terpretation seeks to ascertain the actual meaning of the statute as 
manifested by the text,175 without reference to any particular set of 
172. This phenomenon of blindly transporting the application of a concept from 
one legal context to another without considering the difference in contexts has been 
succinctly described by one scholar as the "fallacy of the transplanted category." See 
Hancock, supra note 171. Tracing a line of cases interpreting the word "consent," Han­
cock points out that even where a single word is always used in reference to the same 
subject matter (with consent, in "reference to ... the state of a person's mind in relation 
to a particular transaction"), because of the diverse policy goals of the different statutes 
in which the word appears, it is illogical to assume that the phrase will always have the 
same scope. Id. at 549-51 ("[T]he meaning of a legal term will usually vary according to 
the legal result involved ...."). Likewise, the phrase "under color of law" is used in 
reference to the same subject matter-some perceived abuse of government author­
ity-in both the civil rights statutes and § 7214. However, because the situation in 
which that abuse of authority occurs varies between the statutes, so too should the 
application of the phrase "under color of law." 
173. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 130, at 11 ("It is the courts' duty to determine 
the legislative intent and give it effect."); USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 171, at 37-39. 
174. USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 171, at 39-40; see 
also BROWN & BROWN, supra note 130, at 3 (recognizing a distinction between inter­
pretation and application, the authors note that "[c]areful interpretation is important to 
the larger venture of using statutes"). As Chief Justice Marshall stated: "It is the pecu­
liar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society; 
the application of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of 
other departments." Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810) (emphasis 
added). However, the interpretation and application processes are often combined by 
courts, which ask only whether the legislature intended the statute to apply in this way. 
See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 171, at 6. Searching for the legislature's intended appli­
cation of a statute impermissibly expands the role of the legislature by giving it power 
to apply a statute, a power granted solely to the judiciary in Article III of the Constitu­
tion. See USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 171, at 39. 
175. See USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 171, at 21-23 
(discussing the differences between actual meaning and intended meaning). Actual 
meaning is the meaning that the words of the statute convey to a typical reader. Id. at 
21. This approach focuses on the legislative intent as it is objectively manifested in the 
text of the law and recognizes that it is the text of the statute that has to be agreed on by 
both houses of the legislature, as well as the president, in order for a bill to become law. 
See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 130, at 13·14 (approaching legislative intent under 
contract law theory, parties are held to the intent they have objectively manifested to 
each other); USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 171, at 27-28. 
Proponents of an actual meaning approach argue that it is "essential to stability in the 
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facts,176 Courts are required to interpret a statute based on the 
meaning expressed by Congress.177 Application, on the other hand, 
is the process of determining the legal consequences of the statute 
on a given fact pattern.178 Because application determines the out­
come of a case, this process is the sole province of the courtS.179 
Before applying any statute containing "under color of law" 
language, the court's duty is to determine the actual meaning of 
that phrase-the meaning the legislature created in the text of the 
statute.180 This Note does not quarrel with the Temple court's defi­
nition of "under color of law" in § 7214(a) as an abuse of official 
authority.181 Rather, it defends the court's definition as accurate in 
the context of § 7214(a). 
law." Id. at 35. Laws must be fixed and knowable to the public to maintain a stable, 
ordered society, and the intended meaning of the legislature is "inherently less knowa­
ble and fixed than actual meaning." Id. at 36. The Department of Justice makes a 
convincing constitutionally based argument for the "primacy" of actual meaning. Id. at 
26-37. It also demonstrates how a search for actual meaning alleviates many of the 
criticisms of the use of legislative history. See id. at 79-80. 
176. See USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 171, at 38 
("[I]t is often possible to ... ascertain the actual meaning of [a] statute-without refer­
ence to particular fact situations."). 
177. This requirement stems from the need to preserve the separation of powers 
between the legislative and judicial branches of government. See MIKVA & LANE, 
supra note 171, at 4; USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 171, at 
33-34. It is universally accepted that courts should "adhere to the legislative intent" in 
the process of statutory interpretation. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 130, at 11 (citing 
Donajokowski v. Alpena Power Co., 596 N.W.2d 574, 577 (Mich. 1999)). There are 
many criticisms of the process of ascertaining legislative intent. See, e.g., MIKVA & 
LANE, supra note 171, at 29-31; USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 171, at 47-56 (both discussing the problems with use of legislative history to ascer­
tain intent). However, it is a necessary evil if the courts are to fulfill their role of inter­
pretation without overstepping the bounds of their constitutional powers. Further, 
these criticisms can be overcome by focusing on the actual meaning of the statute rather 
than the intended meaning. See USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 171, at 21-23. 
178. See USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 171, at 37-38. 
179. See generally id. at 39-40. The power granted to the judiciary by Article III 
of the U.S. Constitution is the power to decide specific cases and controversies by ap­
plying legislative rules. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Once the legislature has enacted a 
statute, "its power to control the outcome of litigation ... is at an end." USING AND 
MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 171, at 39-40. 
180. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). 
181. United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 
495 (2006). After accurately noting that this is the first case to consider the phrase 
"willful oppression under color of law" in the context of § 7214(a), the majority looked 
to "commonly held concepts to illuminate the phrase." Id. at 137. For the terms "will­
ful" and "oppression," the court used dictionary definitions to supply their meaning. 
Id. But then, for the phrase "under color of law," the court relied solely on § 242 and 
§ 1983 case law to define "under color of law" in § 7214(a). [d. at 137-38. Though the 
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The search for actual meaning should begin with the text of the 
statute and go no further if that language is plain.182 However, 
there is no plain meaning of the phrase "under color of law" be­
cause it is an idiom-its meaning cannot be ascertained from the 
literal meaning of its combined elements.183 Alternatively, even if a 
court were to argue that "under color of law" can be understood as 
a metaphor184-the phrase is still ambiguous on its face. 
In a case like this, when the statute's meaning is not plain, 
courts must use extrinsic evidence to put the language in context to 
ascertain the actual meaning of the statute.185 As a legislative re­
sponse to a particular problem, every statute has an individualized 
history and purpose.186 To accurately interpret a statute, courts 
must recognize the unique context of the statute they are consider­
ing.187 Though many different sources can be used to give context 
to a statute,188 this Analysis will focus on the problem § 7214(a) was 
designed to remedy and the meaning of the phrase "under color of 
use of a phrase in other statutes may be a consideration in defining that phrase, it 
should not be relied on to the exclusion of other methods to determine the scope of 
language as it is used in a specific statute. See WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL 
AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 159 (1942). When discussing the defini­
tion of "under color of law" in the Temple case, this Note refers to the Temple court 
generally, rather than distinguishing between the majority and concurring opinions be­
cause both opinions adopt the same meaning of the phrase. They differ only on the 
proper method of applying that definition in § 7214(a) cases. 
182. Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485; BROWN & BROWN, supra note 130, at 38-40; 
MIKVA & LANE, supra note 171, at 5) ("The starting place for any search for statutory 
meaning obviously must be in the language of the statute in question, for it is the lan­
guage of a statute that the legislature enacts."). In the words of Chief Justice Marshall, 
it is "the duty of the court to effect the intention of the legislature, but this intention is 
to be searched for in the words which the legislature has employed to convey it." 
Schooner Paulina's Cargo v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 52, 60 (1812). 
183. MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 21, at 616. 
184. .Id. at 780 ("[A] figure of speech in which a word or phrase literally denoting 
one ... idea is used in place of another ...."); see also Winter, supra note 12, at 384-89 
(analyzing "under color of law" as a metaphor). 
185. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 130, at 38-39 (plain meaning rule). Statu­
tory language often can be unclear "simply because the English language by its very 
nature ... is an inherent breeding ground for ambiguity." Id. at 2; see also Schweg­
mann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384,395-97 (1951) (Jackson, J., concur­
ring); MIKVA & LANE, supra note 171, at 9-10. 
186. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 171, at 1-2. 
187. See HANCOCK supra note 171, at 538 (noting that judges should consider 
"verbal context and ... relation to the factual problem which the statute deals with" 
when interpreting a word or phrase). 
188. See USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 171, at 19-20 
(stating that context may be established narrowly by looking the words surrounding the 
phrase in question, or broadly by looking at the history and circumstances of a statute's 
enactment). 
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law" in other statutes to demonstrate why the Temple court was 
correct to define the phrase as a misuse of authority. 
1. The Problem to be Remedied by § 7214(a) 
"Contextualism" is a method of statutory interpretation that 
considers what was happening economically, politically, or socially 
at the time a statute was enacted, as well as the way in which words 
or phrases were used at that time.189 These extrinsic factors can 
help a court understand the purpose of the statute, and thus to in­
terpret it in a manner consistent with that purpose.190 The social 
circumstances in 1868 and the problem Congress was attempting to 
resolve by enacting § 7214(a) support the definition of "under color 
of law" adopted by the Temple court. 
In 1868, Congress was presented with evidence that Internal 
Revenue agents across the country were misusing, or acting beyond 
the scope of, their actual authority as agents.191 Widespread alco­
hol tax fraud was occurring because of Internal Revenue agents' 
lack of integrity and their willingness to cooperate with whiskey 
rings.192 Revenue agents were also unlawfully seizing property 
under the guise of authority and extorting settlements for tax 
debts.193 This abuse of authority was rampant and apparently diffi­
cult to prevent among the 3882 agents scattered across the coun­
try,194 especially without any criminal penalties to deter agent 
189. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 130, at 47-48; see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 
482 U.S. 578, 594-95 (1987) (noting that the inquiry into legislative purpose requires 
examination of "[t]he plain meaning of the statute's words, enlightened by their context 
and the contemporaneous legislative history" as well as "the historical context of the 
statute ... and the specific sequence of events leading to passage of the statute"). Leg­
islative history can be used to reveal the problem a statute was intended to remedy, as 
welI as the historical circumstances in which it was enacted. BROWN & BROWN, supra 
note 130, at 43 ("The court [should] seek[] to identify the 'evil' ... the statute was 
intended to eradicate and interpret it in a manner to accomplish that purpose."). 
190. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 130, at 47-48; see also USING AND MISUSING 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 171, at 67 ("Statutory meaning that might otherwise 
be uncertain may take on a distinctive color through the context provided" by under­
standing the legislative goaL). An understanding of the purposes of the statute will also 
help the court in applying the statute. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
191. See CONGo GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 364 (1868). 
192. See id.; supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (discussing the historical 
circumstances that necessitated the enactment of § 7214). 
193. See, e.g., United States V. Deaver, 14 F. 595, 599-602 (1882) (instructing the 
jury on charges against a revenue officer for the destruction of a taxpayer's still under 
the guise of his office, but without actual authority, and for collecting "special taxes" 
that were not officialIy sanctioned). 
194. AMERICAN WAY, supra note 86, at 32. The lack of technology in 1868-no 
telephone, fax, e-mail, or even next-day delivery service to facilitate communication­
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misconduct.195 It was within this state of affairs that Congress 
passed § 7214(a). Because the statute was created specifically to 
remedy a documented abuse of authority by Internal Revenue 
agents, it is logical to conclude that the phrase "under color of law" 
was used to connote an abuse of authority. 
In addition, there are some well-established canons of con­
struction196 that, when applied to the phrase "under color of law" in 
§ 7214(a), also support the definition adopted by the Temple court. 
One canon is that a court should presume that if the word used has 
a technical meaning or is a term of art the legislature intended that 
meaning in the statute.197 By the time the phrase "under color of 
law" first appeared in American laws, it had become a term of art 
understood to imply action taken by an official under the deceptive 
appearance of authority.198 The jury instruction published in 
United States v. Deaver demonstrates that in the 1800s, "under color 
of law" was understood as a term of art.199 
presumably allowed much agent misconduct to go unseen by supervisors in the time it 
took them to physically travel to IRS outposts across the country. 
195. The youth of the IRS, combined with its rapid growth and lack of organiza­
tion, were probably also factors contributing to the misconduct of its agents. See AMER· 
ICAN WAY, supra note 86, at 31-33; HISTORY OF TAXATION, supra note 86. In addition, 
revenue agents were either appointed to the IRS based on political ties or contracted by 
the government as private collectors, without regard to their character and fitness for 
the job. See CONGo GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 364-66, 3378-81 (1868); AMERICAN 
WAY, supra note 86, at 33. 
196. Courts bear a heavy burden in interpreting statutes. They ate bound to en­
force the command of the legislature but are often stuck in situations where the lan­
guage of a statute is ambiguous, and there is scant or unreliable legislative history 
available to clarify the ambiguity. To help ease this burden, the judiciary has developed 
canons of construction that function as presumptions about legislative meaning. 
BROWN & BROWN, supra note 130, at 71-74; see also MIKVA & LANE, supra note 171, at 
23-25 (listing numerous canons of construction used in statutory interpretation). These 
canons are used by courts to "fill the void that exists when there is no other reasonable 
way to know how to interpret [the language of a] statute." BROWN & BROWN, supra 
note 130, at 72. 
197. .Id. at 87-88. When words have "acquired a legal and technical signification 
we must presume that the legislature used them in their legal and technical sense." 
Deaver, 14 F. at 596·97; see also MIKVA & LANE, supra note 171, at 25 ("Words are to 
be given their common meaning, unless they are technical terms or words of art. "). 
Contra Hancock, supra note 171, at 541-42 ("[T]his canon had always yielded to the 
least suggestion of contrary intention."). 
198. See generally Winter, supra note 12, at 323-28 (summarizing the history of 
the phrase "under color of law"). Winter concludes that where Congress uses a phrase 
with a technical meaning, it intends to adopt that phrase as a term of art, and this is 
why there is little debate over the use of the words "under color of law" within the 
legislative history of 42 U.S.c. § 1983. Id. at 384. 
199. Deaver, 14 F. 595; see supra text accompanying notes 141-146 (explaining 
how the judges' failure to consider the meaning of "under color of law" demonstrates a 
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The judge in Deaver specifically noted that this was the court's 
first occasion to interpret § 7214(a) and for that reason provided 
the jury with a thorough explanation of the terms "willful" and "op­
pression."20o Yet he did not offer any definition of the phrase 
"under color of law."201 This lack of explanation supports the infer­
ence that "under color of law" had a commonly understood mean­
ing that the jury would grasp without further instruction.202 
Because at the time § 7214(a) was drafted, the phrase "under color 
of law" was a commonly known term of art referring to action 
taken under the deceptive appearance of authority, the Temple 
court was correct to assume that the legislature used the phrase in 
that sense. 
Another canon of statutory interpretation recognizes that 
there is significance in the words that Congress did not use.203 The 
logic of this approach is that the use of specific words creates a 
negative implication, namely that other words were avoided for a 
reason.204 Applying this principle to § 7214(a), if Congress meant 
to create an offense for the willful oppression of another with actual 
authority, it would have used the words "actual authority." It is 
significant that Congress chose the term "under color of law," 
knowing that it had a technical meaning that relied on the appear­
ance of authority, but not actual authority. In § 7214(a), Congress's 
use of a phrase implying abuse of apparent authority must exclude 
from the reach of that statute action properly taken within the 
bounds of authority. This principle of negative implication further 
common understanding of the phrase). Deaver was decided in 1882, only fifteen years 
after § 7214(a) was enacted. Deaver, 14 F. 595. 
200. Id. at 597-99. Section 7214(a) penalizes actors who are guilty of "willful op­
pression under color of law." 26 U.S.c. § 7214(a)(1) (2000). 
201. Deaver, 14 F. at 595-96. 
202. The fact that Congress did not debate the use or meaning of the phrase in 
enacting § 7214 may also evidence that it was considered a term of art with an undis­
puted meaning. See CONGo GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 364-66, 3378-81 (1868) (dem­
onstrating no debate over the phrase "under color of law"). However, it is also possible 
that the phrase was simply not discussed because the provisions of § 7214(a) were not 
the main focus of the bill the committee was instructed to draft. See id. at 3379. Argua­
bly, this phrase may have slipped through unnoticed in the midst of more heated argu­
ments over the appropriate tax rate on distilled liquor. See id. at 3378-80, 3397-99. 
203. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 130, at 78-81. This principle is also em­
bodied in the phrase, expressio un ius est exclusio alterius-the expression of one thing 
implies the exclusion of others. See id. at 81. 
204. Id. at 78-81. 
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confirms that Congress intended § 7214(a) to apply to action that 
constituted an abuse or misuse of authority.20s 
Finally, the principle against surplusage or redundancy assumes 
that Congress intended each word of the statute to have meaning 
and that unnecessary words would have been filtered out by the 
time the statute was enacted.206 Applying that principle, because 
the original language of § 7214(a) required that action be taken 
"under the authority of any revenue law of the United States,"207 
"under color of law" must have a meaning other than actual author­
ity. It would be redundant to interpret the phrase "under color of 
law" to mean actual authority of law where the drafters expressly 
required action under authority of law in the language of the 
preamble. 
The social circumstances in which the statute was drafted, com­
bined with the foregoing canons of construction, support the Tem­
ple court's definition of "under color of law" in the context of 
§ 7214(a) as an abuse of authority. In addition, because the defini­
tion of "under color of law" adopted in Temple was created by, and 
is still applied to, §§ 242 and 1983, Temple preserves a consistent 
meaning of the phrase "under color of law" across all statutes. By 
adopting the same meaning as in §§ 242 and 1983, the court has 
adhered to the principle of construction that statutes on the same 
subject be read consistently with one another,208 and has also ad­
dressed one of the concurring opinion's main concerns.209 
It is appropriate that §§ 242, 1983, and 7214 should all employ 
the same definition of "under color of law" because they were each 
designed to remedy some type of official misconduct.210 However, 
205. Contra Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,212-23 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissent­
ing) (arguing that "under color of law" means with actual authority of law), overruled in 
part by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
206. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 130, at 84-86; MIKVA & LANE, supra note 
171, at 24. 
207. Act Imposing Taxes on Distilled Spirits and Tobacco, and for Other Pur­
poses, ch. 186, § 98, 15 Stat. 125, 165 (1868) (codified at 26 U.S.c. § 7214(a) (2000» 
(emphasis added). 
208. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 171, at 24 ("Statutes that relate to the same 
subject matter ... are to be construed together."). 
209. United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 141 (2d Cir. 2006) (Wesley, J., concur­
ring) ("[A ]llowing subjective impressions, beliefs, or fears to ... drive [the] color-of-Iaw 
analysis ... will make consistent application of color-of-Iaw statutes ... difficult."), cert. 
denied, 127 S. Ct. 495 (2006). 
210. See, e.g., Lurie, supra note 23, at 2090-92 ("[T]he purpose of section 1983 is 
to deter local actors from using their authority to deprive individuals of their federally 
guaranteed rights, and to provide relief if that deterrence fails." (citing Wyatt v. Cole, 
504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992»). 
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It IS on the proper method of applying "under color of law" in 
§ 7214(a) that the Temple majority and concurrence differ. The 
majority, by considering the victims' subjective reactions to Tem­
ple's conduct, correctly applied the phrase "under color of law" in a 
manner that achieves the purposes of § 7214(a). The concurrence, 
on the other hand, erred in arguing that subjective beliefs should 
not be considered in § 7214(a) because of the problems that arise 
using a subjective measure in the context of §§ 242 and 1983. 
B. Application of "Under Color of Law" in § 7214(a) 
This Note argues that applying the phrase "under color of law" 
in § 7214(a) in the same way it is applied in civil rights statutes is 
incorrect. To be sure, it is tempting, and indeed common, to as­
sume that a phrase that appears in mUltiple legal rules has the same 
scope in each of them.211 But to give in to that temptation, as the 
Temple concurrence has done, "has all the tenacity of original sin 
and must constantly be guarded against."212 The scope of any legal 
term is developed through decisions influenced by policy considera­
tions relevant to the specific case before the court.213 To blindly 
apply that term the same way "in a different legal context where a 
different legal result is [at] issue" is improper and may actually frus­
trate the policies behind the statute.214 In order to correctly apply a 
statute, a court must look at its purpose and determine how to ap­
ply it to the facts in a way that furthers that statute's specific 
goals.215 The Temple concurrence falls victim to the "fallacy of the 
transplanted category"216 when it assumes that "under color of law" 
in § 7214 should be applied the same way as it is in §§ 242 and 1983. 
The concurring opinion overlooks the unique goals of § 7214 and 
the differences in the actors and the types of misconduct § 7214 was 
intended to reach when it assumes that the phrase "under color of 
law" should be applied identically in all three statutes. 
For any statute containing the phrase "under color of law" to 
apply to a case, there must be some indication of government au­
thority that facilitated the wrongdoing.217 The difficulty is deter­
211. See COOK, supra note 181, at 159; Hancock, supra note 171, 546-51. 
212. COOK, supra note 181, at 159. 
213. See Hancock, supra note 171, at 546-47. 
214. Id. at 547. 
215. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
216. Hancock, supra note 171, at 547. 
217. See, e.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) (holding that ac­
tion is taken under color of law only when the "wrongdoer is clothed with the authority 
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mining how to measure the presence of such authority: objectively, 
subjectively, or by some combination of the twO.218 A majority of 
courts in § 242 and § 1983 cases favor a purely objective analysis, 
arguing that consideration of subjective beliefs could allow liability 
to be imposed on an official acting in a purely personal capacity, 
conduct that §§ 242 and 1983 are constitutionally prevented from 
reaching.219 The problem with the concurring opinion in the Tem­
ple case is that it assumes that the search for indicia of authority 
should be the same in § 7214(a) as in §§ 242 and 1983: using an 
objective standard, but never a purely subjective measure. 
Although "under color of law" has the same meaning in all 
three statutes, § 7214(a) has a history and purpose unique from that 
of the civil rights statutes and should not be applied in the same 
way. Using a purely subjective standard to measure whether action 
is taken "under color of law" in § 7214(a) is appropriate because it 
achieves the purposes of the statute without raising the issues asso­
ciated with use of subjective belief in §§ 242 and 1983 cases. This 
Section reviews the purpose of § 7214(a) and demonstrates that the 
Temple majority achieved the statute's goals using a subjective stan­
dard to find that Temple acted "under color of law." Further, this 
Section rebuts the concerns raised in the concurring opinion by 
demonstrating that application of a subjective standard in § 7214(a) 
does not create the same problems as it would in the civil rights 
statutes. 
1. 	 Using a Subjective Test Achieves the Purposes of 
§ 7214(a) 
Congress enacted § 7214(a) in the early years of the IRS for a 
unique purpose: to remedy the rampant transgressions of Internal 
Revenue employees by creating criminal penalties for miscon­
duct.220 Since 1868, that purpose has been expanded to impose a 
standard of conduct on any federal employee acting in connection 
with a U.S. revenue law and to punish deviations from that stan­
dard regardless of whether the employee is acting in an official ca­
of ... law"); accord Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109-12 (1945). This is true in 
the context of all three sections (242, 1983 and 7214) since they employ the same defini­
tion of "under color of law." See supra Part IV. A. 
218. See Libby, supra note 9, at 733. See generally supra Part I.B. (reviewing the 
approaches courts have taken to the "under color of law" inquiry in §§ 242 and 1983). 
219. See Screws, 325 U.S. at 111; supra notes 33-34,40-42 and accompanying text. 
220. See CONGo GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 364-66, 3380-450 (1868); supra text 
accompanying notes 191-195 (history of § 7214's enactment). 
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pacity when such misconduct occurS.221 As a result, there are two 
primary purposes of § 7214(a) today: (1) to set a standard of con­
duct for federal employees,222 and (2) to reach any of those employ­
ees acting in connection with revenue laws who breach that 
standard.223 
To achieve these goals, courts have liberally applied § 7214(a) 
to conduct by federal employees that only remotely implicates In­
ternal Revenue laws, and without regard whether or not such action 
is taken in the course of official duties.224 Indeed, § 7214(a) has 
frequently been applied to actions of federal employees taken in a 
purely personal capacity.225 For example, in United States v. Stern, 
the court explicitly recognized that the purpose of the statute was 
to impose high standards of conduct on federal employees and that, 
"[q]uite realistically, some of these derelictions may be committed 
outside the performance of the officer's official duties."226 
As illustrated by the TempLe majority, using a subjective mea­
sure of "under color of law" can successfully carry out the goals of 
§ 7214(a). Indeed, the result in TempLe was the conviction of a fed­
eral employee whose behavior toward two New York City police 
detectives departed from the high standard of conduct demanded of 
federal employees under § 7214(a). Temple, a quality analyst for 
the IRS, falls into the category of individuals the statute is intended 
to reach both because she was an employee of the United States 
221. See United States v. Stern, 418 F.2d 198, 199 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. 
Johnson, 398 F.2d 29, 31 (7th Cir. 1968); United States v. McDonald, 26 F. Cas. 1085, 
1085 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1876) (No. 15,670) (discussing the "rigid accountability" to which 
officers of the government should be held). 
222. Section 7214(a) was originally enacted to create a code of conduct for Inter­
nal Revenue agents. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. 
223. Since its enactment, the goal of § 7214(a) has been expanded to impose a 
high standard of conduct on all federal employees acting in connection with a revenue 
law. See supra notes 103-108 and accompanying text. 
224. See Johnson, 398 F.2d at 31; supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of conduct in 
connection with revenue laws. Because "willful oppression under color of law" is only 
one of nine enumerated offenses in § 7214(a), the remainder of which do not require 
action to be taken "under color of law," it would be inaccurate to say that preventing 
action taken "under color of law" is the main purpose of § 7214(a). See 26 U.S.C 
§ 7214(a) (2000). The proper application of the statute for anyone offense must be 
determined in light of the purpose of the statute as a whole. See MIKVA & LANE, supra 
note 171, at 24 ("A statute should be read to avoid internal inconsistencies."). 
225. See Stern, 418 F.2d at 198-99 (holding an IRS agent liable for fraudulent 
statements made on his personal tax return); Johnson, 398 F.2d at 31-32 (holding a 
revenue agent liable for inaccurate statements on returns prepared by him for others, 
outside of work, for compensation, and where his position at the IRS had nothing to do 
with the preparation or review of tax returns). 
226. Stern, 418 F.2d at 199; accord Johnson, 398 F.2d at 31. 
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and, because by telling the detectives she would initiate an audit 
against them, she acted in connection with a revenue law.227 
Moreover, Temple's actions amounted to willful oppression of 
the detectives "under color of law."228 The majority focused on the 
detectives' perception of Temple's official status when she 
threatened them as evidence that Temple acted "under color of 
law." The detectives' subjective understanding of Temple's con­
duct-their belief that she would have them audited-demon­
strated that she had misused her authority as an Internal Revenue 
employee to threaten the detectives.229 
The majority expressly acknowledged that the purpose of 
§ 7214(a) was to punish departures from the high standard of con­
duct demanded of federal government officials, and that its holding 
accomplished this purpose-concluding that "Temple's ... behavior 
. represent[s] a significant departure from those standards."230 Be­
cause her threats were related to an Internal Revenue law and were 
intentionally made by a federal employee for the purpose of intimi­
dation, Temple's actions constituted willful oppression "under color 
of law" as defined by § 7214(a).231 The Temple majority was cor­
rect to allow the subjective perception of the victims to drive the 
analysis of Temple's conduct because doing so satisfied the pur­
poses of the statute. Furthermore, using a subjective analysis does 
not create the same problems in § 7214(a) that a purely subjective 
measure raises in § 242 and § 1983 analyses. 
2. 	 A Subjective Test Does Not Create Problems in 
§ 7214(a) 
The Temple concurrence focuses on problems caused by the 
use of a subjective standard in the "under color of law" inquiry.232 
The concurrence's major objection to the use of a subjective stan­
227. United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2006), cerro denied, 
127 S. Ct. 495 (2006); accord United States v. Temple, 342 F. Supp. 2d 233, 238 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev'd, 447 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2006). The District Court did acknowl­
edge that there may be some dispute on this element of the charge but that "a reasona­
ble jury could have found that Temple was acting in connection with the revenue laws 
because her threat to the detectives involved IRS audits." Id. at 238. 
228. Temple, 447 F.3d at 137-39. 
229. [d. at 139 ("[Temple's] oppressive conduct was indeed made possible by her 
perceived ability to invoke the ... authority of her department." (emphasis added)). 
230. Id. 
231. See id. at 137 (defining "willful oppression" as an intentional, unjust exercise 
of power). 
232. /d. at 141-44 (Wesley, J., concurring). 
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dard is that it will destroy the distinction between action taken in a 
personal capacity and state action, which is a constitutional prereq­
uisite to the applicability of the civil rights statutes.233 Additionally, 
the concurrence is concerned about the possibility of inconsistent 
application of "under color of law" statutes given that the victim's 
subjective belief is not a consideration under the civil rights stat­
utes.234 However, these concerns are misplaced because they focus 
on issues that arise only because of the constitutional limits of 
§§ 242 and 1983. As the remainder of this Section will demonstrate, 
none of the problems raised by the concurrence exist when applying 
a subjective measure of "under color of law" in the context of 
§ 7214(a). 
a. 	 Liability for action taken in a personal capacity is permissible 
in § 7214(a) cases 
In analyses of the phrase "under color of law" in §§ 242 and 
1983, the primary concern with relying on the victim's subjective 
belief in the actor's authority is that it may create liability for action 
taken by an official in a purely personal capacity. Actions taken in 
a personal capacity are plainly outside the scope of the civil rights 
statutes. Because those statutes seek to prevent the deprivation of 
constitutional rights, there must be some connection between the 
actor's status and the harm done.235 The phrase "under color of 
law" was used in the civil rights statutes to ensure that the Constitu­
tion's state action requirement would be met before those statutes 
could apply.236 The concern in § 242 and § 1983 cases is that when 
subjective beliefs are considered, "it is no longer the defendant's 
status and conduct as a public official ... that determines whether 
[the] statute will apply. "237 
However, § 7214(a) does not address the deprivation of consti­
tutional rights,238 and therefore does not require that the actor have 
a connection with the sovereign. Thus, it is not problematic that a 
subjective analysis may create liability for personal capacity actions 
233. [d. at 144 (stating that use of a subjective standard "would eliminate any 
distinction between acts under color of law and personal pursuits"). In § 242 and 
§ 1983 cases, most courts have rejected a purely subjective standard of "under color of 
law" because it may impose liability on government officials acting in a personal capac­
ity. See supra notes 32-35, 40-43 and accompanying text. 
234. Temple, 447 F.3d at 145 (Wesley, 1., concurring). 
235. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945). 
236. See supra notes 33-34, 40-42 and accompanying text. 
237. Temple, 447 F.3d at 142 (Wesley, 1., concurring). 
238. See 26 U.S.c. § 7214(a) (2000). 
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in § 7214(a) cases. On the contrary, § 7214(a) has been expressly 
applied to federal employees acting in a personal capacity outside 
the scope of their official duties.239 Congress specifically removed 
the requirement that a wrongdoer must act under the authority of 
revenue laws,240 and the statute's current language contains no re­
quirement that employees be acting in the course of their duties to 
be subject to the penalties of § 7214(a). 
Under the plain language of § 7214(a), as long as the actor is a 
government employee acting in connection with a revenue law, he 
may be charged with any of the offenses under the statute.241 So 
long as the two objective criteria of the preamble-that the actor is 
both a federal employee and has acted in connection with a revenue 
law-are met, it is irrelevant for the purposes of § 7214(a) whether 
the actions were taken in a personal or official capacity. Conse­
quently, it is not problematic to use a subjective measure of "under 
color of law" in § 7214(a), even if it does result in liability for ac­
tions taken in a personal capacity because the statute is intended to 
reach such conduct. 
b. 	 Subjective approach maintains consistent meaning of "under 
color of law" 
The concurring opinion in Temple is also concerned that use of 
a subjective standard would result in inconsistent application of 
statutes containing the phrase "under color of law."242 However, 
this concern ignores the subtle distinction between application and 
interpretation.243 Application requires the court to give effect to 
the purposes of a specific statute.244 It is illogical to insist on consis­
tent application of the phrase "under color of law" where it is used 
in statutes that have distinctly different purposes.245 Though 
§§ 242, 1983, and 7214(a) were all designed to remedy some official 
misconduct, they are different types of statutes, distinct from each 
other in the group of persons and scope of conduct to which they 
apply. 
239. See United States v. Stem, 418 F.2d 198, 198-99 (2d Cir. 1969); United States 
v. Johnson, 398 F.2d 29, 31 (7th Cir. 1968); discussion supra Part II.B.2. . 
240. See H. R. REP. No. 83-1337, at 287 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4017,4575. 
241. 26 U.S.c. § 7214(a). 
242. Temple, 447 F.3d at 145 (Wesley, J., concurring). 
243. See supra notes 173-179 and accompanying text (discussing the two 
concepts). 
244. See USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 171, at 39. 
245. See generally Hancock, supra note 171. 
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Sections 242 and 1983 are civil rights statutes, originally de­
signed to protect the constitutional rights of newly emancipated 
slaves.246 Determining whether action was taken "under color of 
law" is a constitutional prerequisite to their application.247 These 
statutes do not name a concrete group of actors to whom they ap­
ply. Rather, they are applicable to any person who deprives an­
other of her constitutional rights "under color of law"-that is, with 
some indication of state authority.248 Therefore, the determination 
of whether there is a sufficient connection between the actor and 
the sovereign to find that action was taken "under color of law" 
becomes the essential element in applying the civil rights 
statutes.249 
On the other hand, § 7214(a) is a criminal statute located 
within the Internal Revenue Code. It explicitly defines the cate­
gory of persons and scope of conduct to which it applies.250 Addi­
tionally, because action taken "under color of law" is an element in 
only one of the nine offenses under the statute,251 the "under color 
of law" inquiry is not central to the purpose of § 7214(a) as a whole. 
Even when a defendant is charged under § 7214(a)(1), the one of­
fense that requires action to be taken "under color of law," the 
"under color of law" determination is only one element of that of­
fense.252 It is equally important in a § 7214(a) case for the court to 
find that the conduct in question was done by a federal employee 
acting in connection with a revenue law and that it willfully op­
pressed the victim.253 The scope of the "under color of law" inquiry 
is narrower and not of the same constitutional magnitude in 
§ 7214(a) than it is in § 242 and § 1983. To require consistent appli­
cation among all "under color of law" statutes ignores the distinct 
purposes the phrase serves in these different legal contexts. 
Alternatively, if the concurrence's real concern is that "under 
color of law" be defined consistently across statutes, that concern is 
also unfounded because the majority has adopted a meaning of 
246. Maloy, supra note 22, at 571-72; supra text accompanying notes 23-24. 
247. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text (giving history of the civil 
rights statutes). 
248. See 18 U.S.c. § 242 (2000); 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (2000). 
249. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 938-39 (1982); supra notes 
33-34, 40-42. 
250. See 26 U.S.C. § 7214(a) (2000). 
251. See id. 
252. Section 7214(a)(I) creates an offense for a federal employee "who is guilty 
of any extortion or willful oppression under color of law." Id. 
253. See id. 
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"under color of law" consistent with the civil rights statutes' defini­
tion of the phrase.254 The Supreme Court held that the definition 
of "under color of law" in United States v. Classic "formulated a 
rule of law which has become the basis of federal enforcement in 
this important field. "255 The Temple court abided by this rule, and 
adopted the exact meaning of "under color of law" defined in Clas­
sic and used in §§ 242 and 1983 cases since.256 It is sufficient that 
there be consistent meaning of "under color of law" among statutes 
employing the phrase. Consistent application, however, is unneces­
sary and is contrary to the text and purposes of the statute. 
c. 	 Use of a subjective measure will not flood courts with 

§ 7214(a) litigation 

Finally, the concurrence implies that the application of a sub­
jective standard will result in "uncontrolled" use of "under color of 
law" statutes, which will flood courts with frivolous litigation.257 
Yet, this concern is unfounded for several reasons. Section 7214( a) 
can only be applied to a limited group of people-federal employ­
. ees who are acting in connection with a revenue law.258 In addition, 
the statute only prohibits nine specific types of behavior by mem­
bers of that group.259 These criteria naturally limit the applicability 
of § 7214(a) and, consequently, the number of suits that could arise 
under it. 
Most important, § 7214(a) only provides a criminal remedy to 
be pursued by the government; it does not create a private cause of 
action.260 This limits the number of cases § 7214(a) will generate 
because the actions alleged must be serious enough to be reported 
to, and prosecuted by, the government. Even if subjective beliefs 
are allowed to drive the "under color of law" analysis in § 7214(a), 
it is highly unlikely that a flood of cases will follow. None of the 
254. See United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 137-38 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 
127 S. Ct. 495 (2006); supra Part I.A.1-.2 (presenting the § 242 and § 1983 definition of 
"under color of law"). 
255. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184-85 (1961) (quoting Screws v. United 
States, 325 U.S. 91, 112-13 (1945», overruled in part by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 
436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
256. Temple, 447 F.3d at 138. 
257. See id. at 145 (Wesley, J., concurring). 
258. See 26 U.S.c. § 7214(a). 
259. See id. 
260. See id.; Overton v. United States, 44 F. App'x 932, 933-34 (10th Cir. 2002); 
supra Part II.B.3 (no private cause of action under § 7214). 
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issues raised by the concurring opinion in TempLe are valid concerns 
in the context of § 7214(a). 
CONCLUSION 
Appropriate application of the phrase "under color of law" 
must be determined in the context of the statute in which it ap­
pears. The concerns raised in the TempLe concurrence about the 
use of a subjective standard261 are misplaced because they focus on 
the application of "under color of law" in § 242 and § 1983 cases, 
not in the context of § 7214(a). The phrase "under color of law" in 
§ 7214(a) is used only to define one type of prohibited conduct 
under that statute, and it was not intended to be applied the same 
way as it is in the civil rights statutes, where the phrase operates as 
a constitutional limitation on the statutes' applicability.262 The 
TempLe majority opinion takes the correct approach by defining the 
phrase "under color of law" consistently with its definition in §§ 242 
and 1983, but applying the phrase differently in § 7214(a) in order 
to achieve the purposes of that statute.263 
In § 7214(a) cases, the victim's subjective perception of the 
wrongdoer's authority should be considered in the "under color of 
law" analysis. Use of a sUbjective standard achieves the purpose of 
§ 7214(a)-to impose a high standard of conduct on federal em­
ployees acting in connection with Internal Revenue laws.264 Fur­
ther, because objective criteria in the preamble of § 7214(a) 
specifically define the category of persons the statute can reach, re­
liance on a victim's sUbjective perception cannot create liability in a 
party that the statute was not intended to reach. The TempLe ma­
jority correctly applied the phrase in the context of § 7214(a) when 
it held that Temple acted "under color of law" based on the detec­
tives' subjective reaction to her conduct. 
Sarah T. BioLsi 
261. Temple, 447 F.3d at 141 (Wesley, 1., concurring). 
262. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2. 
263. Temple, 447 F.3d at 130-39. 
264. See discussion supra Parts ILA, 1I.B.1. 

